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papers are centered around the theme Financial Risk in a Liberalized
Electricity Market with a focus on applied mathematical modelling and
financial economics in the context of liberalized electricity markets.
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Summary
Electricity markets around the world are currently undergoing a liberal-
ization process that changes the way electricity is traded and priced as
a commodity. The electricity system has unique technical characteris-
tics and the importance of electricity as a good in today’s informational
society is significant. Liberalization does not change the fact that politi-
cians and regulators will be held responsible for keeping the lights on at
reasonable costs. What changes is the tool used by regulators to accom-
plish this task. The introduction of competitive markets implies that
market participants will be held financial responsible for their decisions.
Regulated system operators remain responsibility for the physical bal-
ancing and electricity markets will therefore remain strongly regulated
even after liberalization.
The combination of strongly regulated but competitive trading arrange-
ments creates an environment where market participants will face a new
set financial of risks comprising elements of competition, physical elec-
tricity characteristics and potential political regulatory intervention. On
the other side of the market regulators and politicians will face the com-
plex task of designing an electricity market that can outperform the pre-
viously regulated monopolies with respect to the three main requirements
of security of supply, economical efficiency and environmental protection.
The economic theory of electricity markets forms an essential basis for
decision making in a liberalized setting. The effect of financial risk on
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decision making is becoming an increasingly important topic within this
field of electricity economics, due to the significant elements of uncer-
tainty in electricity markets. A primary goal of the thesis is to increase
the understanding of how the introduction of competitive markets affects
the financial risk related to different decision problems within the areas
of risk management and investments in liberalized electricity markets.
Focus is on applied microeconomics and analyzes of the interplay be-
tween market design parameters and the technical characteristics of the
electricity system.
Theory, literature and introduction to specific problem areas related to
risk management and investments is provided in two separate introduc-
tory chapters. Contributions to research within specific problems areas
is then subsequently provided by five research papers. The two topics
are relatively broad, however the two chapters and five papers all share
analyzes of financial risk in liberalized electricity markets as a common
underlying theme.
The risk management part of the thesis focusses on modelling and mea-
surement of financial risk in electricity markets. Key topics are electricity
price modelling and the development of risk measures suitable for elec-
tricity market portfolios.
Risk management tools used for financial assets have until recently largely
been transferred more or less directly to electricity market portfolios
which include physical assets such as power plants and retail contracts.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the relevance of financial tools for
electricity market risk management, depends critically on the technical
characteristics of electricity assets and on the demands placed by the
stakeholders in the electricity sector. In many cases such technical char-
acteristics and stakeholder demands will imply a need for revised and
renewed tools compared to those used for portfolios of financial assets.
Chapter 2 in the thesis discuss such developments and provides a liter-
ature review of risk management modelling theory and applications in
electricity markets.
Research papers A and B analyze electricity price modelling with a focus
on the use of different types of input data. Paper A examines the combi-
nation of price scenarios from a technical bottom-up model and market
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data. Paper B examines the price modelling based on market based data
and the use of the Profit at Risk (PaR) measure. Paper E is also related
to risk management, however focus is here on strategies for wind turbine
owners acting in both an electricity market and a market for tradable
green certificates.
The investment part of the thesis focusses on market modelling and on
the policy aspect of supply security. Key topics are analyzes of the pric-
ing mechanism in electricity markets, implementation of financial risk in
equilibrium market models and the effect of market design on capacity
investments and supply security. Chapter 3 reviews investments in gen-
eration capacity in a liberalized market from both a policy and a market
perspective. The individual investor perspective is also briefly reviewed,
but is used mainly as a basis for the analysis of financial investment risk
in a market perspective.
Paper D presents a framework for the inclusion of financial risk into par-
tial equilibrium models of the electricity market. The focus is on the
technical modelling aspects of uncertainty and risk aversion in this type
of setting. The framework is motivated by the need solve the problems of
model complexity and tractability that are associated with representa-
tion of stochastic parameters and practically applied risk measures such
as PaR.
Paper C treats the policy aspect of investments in terms of the effects
of market design on the balance between economical efficiency and secu-
rity of supply. The paper describes the type of market imperfections and
sources of market failure that are induced by the technical characteristics
of the electricity system. A framework of different models for capacity
regulation is presented and the models are analyzed and compared in
relation to the market imperfections and sources of market failure iden-
tified.
The analysis of the interplay between the technical characteristics of
the electricity system (engineering) and market design (economics) is a
central theme throughout the thesis. Each of the five research papers
contribute to this type of cross-disciplinary research within the field of
electricity economics and provide directions for further research.
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Resume´
Liberaliseringen af el-markedet ændrer ma˚ den hvorp˚a elektricitet han-
dles og prisfastsættes som et gode. El-systemet har en række fysiske
karakteristika som vanskeliggør markedsbaseret handel. Elektricitet spiller
en central rolle i samfundet og liberaliseringen vil ikke ændre p˚a det fak-
tum, at politikere vil blive holdt ansvarlige for b˚ade forsyningssikkerhed
og elpriserne p˚a lang sigt. Liberaliseringen betyder derfor snarere omreg-
ulering end deregulering og kan først og fremmest betragtes som et skift i
det værktøj, politikere og systemansvarlige anvender for at opn˚a en bal-
ance imellem de tre primære krav til elsektoren om økonomisk efficiens,
forsyningssikkerhed og miljøbeskyttelse.
Den blanding af konkurrence og regulering, som liberaliseringen af el-
markedet medfører, fører til en radikal ændring i den finansielle risikoek-
sponering som de forskellige aktører i markedet elsektoren udsættes for.
Producenter, leverandører og forbrugere eksponeres for finansielle risiko
som følge af fluktuationer i priser, volumener og omkostninger. Poli-
tikere og systemansvarlige st˚ar p˚a den anden side af markedet med den
vanskelige opgave at designe markedet, s˚aledes at finansielle risici og po-
tentielle markedsimperfektioner ikke forringer muligheden for at opfylde
de tre primære krav.
B˚ade forbrug og produktion af elektricitet er forbundet med relativt stor
usikkerhed p˚a grund af en signifikant vejrafhngighed. Før liberaliserin-
gen blev denne risiko b˚aret enten af el-forbrugerene gennem tariffer eller
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af samfundet som helhed via diverse subsidier til el-sektoren. Liberalis-
eringen flytter denne risiko til de enkelte aktører i sektoren, og anal-
yse af finansiel risiko er derfor blevet et centralt omr˚ade indenfor elek-
tricitetsøkonomi.
Temaet for denne afhandling er finansiel risiko i et liberaliseret el-marked.
Afhandlingens primære ma˚l er, at øge forst˚aelsen af hvordan introduktio-
nen af et marked baseret p˚a konkurrence vil p˚avirke den finansielle risiko
forbundet med forskellige beslutningsproblemer inden for omr˚aderne risiko-
styring og investeringer i produktionskapacitet. Fokus i afhandlingen er
p˚a anvendt mikroøkonomisk analyse og p˚a samspillet imellem markeds-
designparametre og de tekniske systemkarakteristika i el-systemet.
Afhandlingen er bygget op omkring to kapitler, som introducerer teori,
litteratur og specifikke beslutningsproblemer indenfor de to hovedomr˚ader.
Det forskningsmæssige indhold er koncentreret i fem separate artikler
som bidrager med udvikling af matematiske modeller samt finansielle
og mikroøknomiske analyser indenfor en række af de specifikke proble-
momr˚ader, som introduceres i de to kapitler.
Analyserne af risikostyring fokuserer p˚a udvikling af modelleringsvrktøjer
og risikoma˚l, som specifikt er tilpasset de fysiske karakteristika, der
kendetegner aktiverne el-markeds aktørernes porteføljer. Den tidlige
fase af liberaliseringen har været præget af en mere eller mindre direkte
overførsel af modeller fra den finansielle sektor til el-markedet. En cen-
tral hypotese i denne afhandling er, at relevansen af disse værktøjer er
stærkt betinget af, hvorvidt de er i stand til b˚ade at afspejle de tekniske
karakteristika af fysiske aktiver og de specifikke krav, som de forskellige
interessenter i elsektoren stiller.
Artiklerne A og B analyserer elprismodellering med fokus p˚a betydningen
af input data. Artikler A præsenterer en optimeringsmodel til konstruk-
tion af forward pris kurver baseret p˚a en kombination af markedsdata og
scenarier fra en bottom-up model af el-markedet. Artikel B analyserer
finansielle elprismodeller baseret udelukkende p˚a markedsdata og brugen
af Profit at Risk som risikoma˚l i elsektoren. Artikel E er ogs˚a relateret
til risikostyring i el-markedet, dog er fokus i dette papir p˚a strategier for
vindmølle ejere i et reguleret system, hvor der handles b˚ade elektricitet
og grønne certifikater.
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Analyserne af investeringer fokuserer p˚a markedsmodellering og policy
aspekter. De primære emner er implementering af finansiel risiko ved in-
vesteringer i markedsmodeller og analyse af hvorledes forskellige modeller
for kapacitetsregulering p˚avirker den økonomiske efficiens af markedsmod-
ellen og forsyningssikkerheden.
Artikel D præsenterer et rammesystem for implementering af risiko ved
investeringsbeslutninger i partielle ligevægtsmodeller. Artiklen er mo-
tiveret af de tekniske modelproblemer forbundet med implementering af
stokastiske parametre og risiko ma˚l i større modeller.
Artikel C omhandler de politiske aspekter af investeringer i el-markedet
med hensyn til ansvaret for forsyningssikkerhed og økonomisk efficiens.
Artiklen beskriver de markedsimperfektioner, der opst˚ar som følge af
tekniske karakteristika i el-systemet, og giver endvidere et overblik og
analyse af en række modeller for kapacitetsregulering udfra dette per-
spektiv.
Analysen af hvorledes de tekniske karakteristika og det specifikke de-
sign af el-markedet spiller sammen og p˚avirker den finansielle risiko for
forskellige interessenter er det centrale tema i afhandlingen. De fem
artikler bidrager hver især til denne form for tværfaglige analyse, som
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the previously regulated electricity sectors around the world, finan-
cial risks were borne by electricity consumers through regulated tariffs
and by society as a whole through various forms of subsidies made to
the electricity sector. The current move towards liberalization1 of elec-
tricity markets in regions around the world involves both a transfer and
a change of the financial risks that different stakeholders in the sector
face. Liberalization expose stakeholders directly to financial risks in the
electricity market and holds decision makers financially rather than po-
litically responsible for their actions.
The general shift in financial risk exposure creates a need for the develop-
ment of new modelling tools explicitly fitted to the specific characteristics
of decision problems in electricity markets. Financial risks affect decision
1The introduction of competition and consumer choice in electricity markets is often
termed ”restructuring” whereas ”privatization” refers to the transference of ownership
from government to private corporations (Hunt & Shuttleworth (1996)). Doorman
(2000) notes that the popular term ”deregulation” understates the persistent need
for regulation and suggests that ”restructuring” is a more proper term. This thesis
will use the term ”liberalization” rather than ”restructuring” to emphasize that the
introduction of competition is a key element in the ongoing changes of electricity
sectors around the world.
2 Introduction
making at all levels of the supply chain. Consumers, retailers, producers
and investors must include the potential effects of risk into the decision
process. Such effects include the costs associated with potential periods
of financial distress or bankruptcy as a worst case scenario.
The effects of financial risks depend largely on the market design. Politi-
cians and regulators in the electricity sector have traditionally been re-
sponsible for balancing the three main requirements of security of supply,
economical efficiency and environmental protection. Liberalization have
changed the tool used by regulators to fulfil this obligation, however,
the task remains unchanged. The effect of interactions between market
design and technical system characteristics on the financial risks faced
by different stakeholders is therefore a key issue both for regulators and
for market participants.
The underlying theme of the thesis is analysis and modelling of finan-
cial risk in electricity economics. Financial risk is part of most decision
problems in the electricity sector and the focus of this thesis is delimited
to decision problems in the areas of risk management and investments
in generation capacity. Electricity economics is highly cross-disciplinary
subject, which brings together multiple sciences. The analysis is there-
fore further restricted to technical modelling aspects of decision problems
rather than organizational, legal or social aspects. This delimitation
highlights that key focus is on the interactions between engineering in
terms of electricity system characteristics and economics in terms of the
financial effects of market design.
A primary goal of the thesis is to increase the understanding of how
the introduction of competitive markets affects the financial risk related
to different decision problems within the areas of risk management and
investments in liberalized electricity markets. This implies a focus on
applied microeconomics and analyzes of the interplay between market
design parameters and the technical characteristics of the electricity sys-
tem.
A secondary goal has been to develop modelling tools that enable the in-
clusion of financial risk effects into decision making in electricity markets.
Focus in this area is on applied mathematical modelling and finance the-
ory and the perspective includes both tools for individual decision making
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and for policy analysis.
1.1 Competitive electricity markets
The electricity industry was considered to be a natural monopoly through-
out most of the 20th century, due to economics of scale in generation and
problems related to separation of transmission and generation activities
(Hunt & Shuttleworth (1996)). Technological innovations in generation
and improved transmission facilities decreased economies of scale during
the last decades of the century and indicated that unbundling of trans-
mission, distribution and generation activities could be possible, provided
that a series of institutional difficulties could be overcome at reasonable
transaction costs (Joskow & Schmalensee (1983)).
The current liberalization of electricity markets is still in a development
phase. To become a successful experiment the market must provide a
satisfactory balance between the three main requirements of economic ef-
ficiency, security of supply and environmental protection (ECON (2002)).
The design of electricity markets is complex due to a series of electric-
ity characteristics that affect supply and demand. These characteristics
form the basis for the modelling risk management and investment deci-
sions and are therefore briefly reviewed in this introductory chapter.
The physical characteristics of the electricity system complicates the de-
sign of electricity markets. Electricity is non-storable2 flow commod-
ity, which is consumed within a tenth of a second after its production
by virtually all consumers (Stoft (2002)). The transmission system can
be viewed as a shared pool with numerous entry and exit points, from
which electricity can be injected or withdrawn. The supply and demand
of power must be kept in a near continuous balance throughout the en-
tire grid to avoid frequency and voltage fluctuations, which can damage
generation and transmission equipment.
The pool structure of the electricity grid implies that electrons cannot
2Electricity can be stored as potential energy in batteries or water reservoirs, but
such options are generally either economically inefficient or subject to constraints.
The issue is addressed further in the following chapters.
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be tracked from the generator to individual consumers. While this in
itself does not create problems for market based trading it does create
potential problems during periods where the system operator is forced
to shed load. If demand exceeds available supply in real-time the system
operator must as a last resort disconnect areas of consumers to avoid
a frequency drop that could potentially result in a total system break-
down. Stoft (2002) describes the blackout problem as a consequence of
two demand-side flaws in current electricity markets.
The first demand flaw is a lack of real-time metering and real-time billing,
which causes a lack of demand elasticity in the market. This creates a
potential for situations where real-time supply and demand curves may
fail to intersect, because demand is completely inelastic at the maximum
level of production capacity available in the market. In much earlier work
on public utility pricing Brown & Johnson (1969) noted that this problem
could be minimized if consumers could contract for reliability through a
futures market. This type of physical reliability enforcement is however
currently prevented by the second demand flaw. The second demand side
flaw in electricity markets is described by Stoft (2002) as the lack of real-
time control with power flow to specific customers. System operators
do not possess the technology required to disconnect consumers at an
individual level and are therefore not able to enforce physical contracts
for delivery.
Both demand and supply are highly stochastic due to a significant de-
pendency on weather conditions. Demand is affected significantly in the
short-term by temperature swings, due to the use of electricity for heat-
ing or air conditioning purposes. In the short-term supply also fluctuates
as a result of forced or planed outages of production plants or failure of
transmission facilities. Combined with the lack of storage these uncer-
tainties lead to highly volatile spot prices which are exacerbated in the
short-term by the inelasticity of supply.
The weather dependence of supply is mainly a factor in systems with a
significant share of hydro power. The level of precipitation follows an
annual cycle and affects available supply years. This creates volatility
in annual price averages, which has a significant effect on both con-
sumers, suppliers and potential investors. The combination of long-run
and short-run fluctuations in prices creates a financially risky environ-
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ment and places significant demands on the design of markets for trading
and hedging such risks in the electricity sector.
Investments in generation capacity have lead times of up to several years.
The combination of an inflexible supply and significant intra-day, weekly
and seasonal patterns in the demand for electricity, implies that the
electricity system must include production units that run with a low ca-
pacity factor. Investment in electricity generation capacity is also capital
intensive (Hughes & Parece (2002)). Combined with low and uncertain
capacity factors this creates a highly risky financial environment for in-
vestments.
Electricity plays a central role in today’s society and the right to a sta-
ble supply at reasonable prices is guarantied through legislation in both
the EU and the US. The uncertainty related to potential political in-
tervention during the development of an electricity market increases the
financial risk for investors. To avoid unnecessary costly risk premiums
and potential business cycles (Ford (1999)), the market design must min-
imize the effects of such political risk.
1.2 The Nordic Electricity Market
The Nordic electricity market3 serves as a reference for a large part of the
analysis performed in the thesis and a short review is therefore provided
in this introductory chapter.
The Nordic electricity market is based on bilateral trading centered
around a multi-national power exchange Nord Pool. Participants are
free to trade power bilaterally, but must submit balance plans to the
national system operators according to a set of country specific criteria.
The multi-national power exchange Nord Pool provides reference prices
for bilateral trading and organizes wholesale trading across subareas and
national borders. Any bilateral trading across such borders must be
submitted as bids through the Nord Pool exchange.
3By Nordic we refer to the the northern part of Europe in terms of the Scandinavian
region and Finland.
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Trading in the Nordic market model is structured around three4 main
sub-markets with different time horizons. To facilitate long-term trading
and risk management Nord Pool runs a market for financial derivatives
called the Eltermin market, which serves as an alternative and reference
to bilateral Over The Counter (OTC) trading. To balance physical trades
Nord Pool runs a day-ahead spot market (Elspot) where prices for indi-
vidual hours 12-36 ahead are determined. Finally each of the national
system operators operate real-time markets for handling of real-time im-
balances. The system operator acts on behalf of the balance responsible
parties as the sole source of demand in the real-time market. Actual
deviations from consumption or production plans scheduled by the bal-
ance responsible parties are used by the system operator to determine
the real-time market price, which is then subsequently used for finan-
cially ex post settlement of imbalances. Figure 1.1 illustrates the market
structure and the key participants.
Figure 1.1: Basic structure of the Nordic electricity market.
No physical exchange of power takes place until real-time, but the day-
4An additional market for readjustment of production plans Elbas with up to one
hour ahead trading are available to Finish and Swedish participants.
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ahead market (Elspot) serves as the main market for physical planning
with ex ante pricing of hourly blocks5. The national system operators
regulate and operate real-time markets by ensuring that a certain volume
of regulating capacity is kept available as reserves.
1.3 Overview of the thesis
The thesis is centered around the theme financial risk management in
liberalized electricity markets. The analyzes are divided into two main
areas focussing on risk management and investments in generation ca-
pacity. This section describes how the thesis adds to existing literature
within these two areas and presents a short review of each of the five
research papers included in the thesis.
Financial risk management theory provides a useful starting point for
electricity risk managers, but must be adapted or renewed to fit the
physical characteristics of electricity assets and technical characteristics
of the electricity system. This thesis contributes to the development
of electricity risk management tools through development and analyzes
of risk modelling and measurement techniques suitable for electricity
markets.
Price is the main tool used by the market to facilitate communication
of preferences between market participants. The non-storable nature of
electricity leads to highly volatile electricity prices and makes the mar-
ket price a key factor in risk management decision problems. A main
hypothesis underlying the analyzes presented in this thesis is that both
market data and technical data about system constraints represent valu-
able information for price modelling. Development of methodology and
electricity price models that include both bottom-up data and market
data is therefore a central theme.
The modelling of financial risk related to investment decisions in gen-
eration capacity is treated from a relatively broad perspective. Focus
is on the interaction between technical characteristics of the electricity
5Swedish and Finish participants have as noted the option to use the Elbas market
where traded can be balanced up until one hour before real-time
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system and market design parameters. The investment perspective is a
market or policy based one. Electricity price is therefore viewed as an
endogenous part of the model or analyzes, rather than as an exogenously
given input for individual decision making.
The treatment of investments takes two main directions. A quantitative
dimension focusses mainly on the inclusion of financial investment risk
into partial equilibrium models i.e. technical modelling of how financial
risk affects the capacity mix at a market level. A more qualitative policy
oriented dimension focusses on how different aspects of market design
affect investment decisions and hence the balance between security of
supply and economic efficiency.
Both risk management and investments are relatively broad topics even
when confined to electricity markets and a Ph.D. thesis could easily be
written about either of the two topics. It is however the authors view that
the underlying theme of financial risk modelling in electricity markets has
provided synergies between the analyzes and improved the treatment of
both subjects.
Structure of the thesis: The thesis contains two main chapters, a
summarizing chapter and five research papers. The aim of the two chap-
ters is to provide an overview of existing theory and literature within
each of the two main research areas. They also serve as an introduction
and motivation to the specific problem areas addressed in each of the
five research papers.
Each of the five papers address specific problems areas related to financial
risk modelling in risk management or investment related decision prob-
lems. The papers cover a relatively broad research area, but are bound
together by a focus on interactions between technical characteristics and
market design and the derived effect on financial risk and investment
decisions in a liberalized electricity market.
Paper A: Paper A analyzes the construction of high resolution forward
price curves in electricity markets. Forward prices express the market’s
risk adjusted expectations about future prices and provides valuable in-
put data for decision problems such as risk management, production
planning, investments in generation and construction of retail contracts.
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Forward price curves are generally only partially revealed by the market
through block products that trade with varying liquidity. The decision
problems listed above will however often require complete6 high resolu-
tion electricity forward price curves as input data. To solve this problem
paper A suggests a Bayesian inspired approach where an apriori informa-
tion set based on available market data is combined with price forecasts
from a bottom-up model to form a forward price curve of high resolution.
The model is formulated as a simple non-linear programming problem.
The model creates a forward curve that is consistent with arbitrage bands
imposed by the bid/ask spreads of traded forward price blocks. The
objective function ensures a smooth curve and minimizes the forward
price curves deviations from a set of price scenarios based on bottom-up
data. The approach is motivated by the hypothesis that both market
data and bottom-up data can contribute with valuable information for
electricity price modelling. Empirical analysis shows that the model
performs better than best alternative models based solely on the use of
market data.
Paper B: Paper B continues the analysis of input data for electricity
price modelling. The paper examines financial price models based solely
on market price data and analyzes the effect of both input data and model
structure on the optimal decision to a simple electricity risk management
problem.
The use of different ”At Risk” measures for risk management in the
electricity sector is discussed and the use of the Profit at Risk (PaR)
measure is examined in a set of simple optimization problems. The
empirical effects of price spike and volume risk modelling on the optimal
solution to a PaR based risk management problem is examined, in a
financial price model based on historical spot price data from the Nord
Pool power exchange.
A primary conclusion of the analysis is that relatively small changes (such
as the inclusion of an additional dry year) in the available set of historical
market data used for parameters estimation affects the solution to the
risk management problem significantly more than choices concerning the
6Complete in the that all time segments priced in the spot market within some
time-frame ∆T are included.
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structure of the price model.
Paper C: Paper C addresses the issue of market design and security of
supply. The paper takes a policy perspective with focus on the effect of
different market design parameters on investments in generation capacity
and security of supply.
The paper starts out by reviewing how the technical characteristics of
electricity systems lead to different types of market imperfections and
sources of market failure. Based on this analysis a categorization and
discussion of different models for capacity regulation in electricity mar-
kets is presented. The models are compared along dimensions such as
capacity type and procurement method and analyzed in relation to the
sources of market failure identified.
Finally, a more detailed analysis of a call option based method for regula-
tion of operating reserves is provided and linked to current developments
in the Nordic market model.
Paper D: Paper D analyzes how financial risk related to investment
decisions in generation capacity can be included into partial equilibrium
models. Focus is on the combined modelling of market prices and invest-
ments in a bottom-up modelling framework. The paper presents a Value
at Risk based framework for inclusion of financial risk. The framework is
based on a separate risk module, which is combined with a deterministic
partial equilibrium model through an exchange of data. The degree of
interaction between the two modules can be used to regulate the tradeoff
between consistency and model complexity.
The methodology is motivated by the need to include uncertainty and
represent risk aversion in a manner consistent with practical applications,
without increasing the model size and complexity beyond tractable lev-
els. A small scale model is implemented and used to test the effect of
stochastic variable costs and stochastic demand empirically.
Paper E: Paper E examines financial risk for investors and producers in
a market for Tradable Green Certificates (TGC). The TGC market is a
policy measure for the support of renewable energy sources. The system
examined is a consumer based version, where electricity consumers are
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obliged to green certificates on a separate market corresponding to a
certain fraction of their electricity consumption. The paper examines
financial risk in an electricity market where wind turbines are the main
source of renewable electricity and hence certificate supply in the TGC
market. Fluctuations in production volumes and imperfect information
about future supply and demand are identified as the two main sources
of uncertainty in this type of system and the potential effect on risk
premiums associated with investments in renewable energy sources is
examined.
The paper derives variance minimizing strategies for renewable producers
acting in both the electricity market and the TGC market. A key point is
that prices will be negatively correlated in the two markets. Production
volume and market price will also be correlated in the TGC market and
these negative correlations will have a stabilizing effect on the income of
renewable suppliers. The analysis are confined to a specific setting where
wind turbines make up a significant part of the supply side. However, the
results illustrate that correlations between risk parameters and between
markets must be addressed properly in order to deduce the effects of this





Liberalization of the Nordic electricity market has introduced compe-
tition at both the wholesale and retail levels. In a competitive market
producers and suppliers of electricity cannot pass financial losses directly
on to consumers and liberalization therefore expose these players to a
significant amount of financial risk. The objective of suppliers and gen-
erators has also changed with liberalization from cost minimization to
maximization of shareholder value. This shift in objective implies that
risk management should therefore be part of a firm’s strategies only to
the extent that it contributes to an increase in shareholder value.
Electricity markets have a series of special characteristics compared to
other commodity and securities markets. These characteristics include
highly volatile wholesale market prices, volume uncertainties and a sig-
nificant element of political risk, due to the critical role that electricity
based services play in today’s society. To properly hedge risks in such an
environment, generators and suppliers need risk management tools that
are explicitly fitted to the specific characteristics of electricity markets.
The development of such tools is a cross disciplinary task that combines
financial economics and electrical engineering. A technical understand-
14 Risk Management in Liberalized Electricity Markets
ing of the electricity system is necessary to properly identify and model
risk factors, whereas financial mathematics is required to measure and
price the effects of relevant risk factors.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes the
theoretical arguments for corporate risk management and reviews some
cornerstones of risk management theory. Based on this introduction a
set of key steps in the risk management process is described and issues
specific to electricity market risk management are analyzed.
2.1 Risk Management Theory
The main goal of this section is to introduce some of the key concepts of
risk management theory and to describe how they apply in an electricity
market context. The aim is not to give a complete overview of risk
management theory, but rather to provide a foundation for the analysis
of specific problem areas presented in the papers of the thesis. The reader
is referred to Dudley (2001) for a comprehensive overview of the different
types of risk presented by electricity markets.
Before turning to a description of theory it is reasonable to ask why
companies should direct resources towards risk management. Since all
decision making should be based on the maximization of shareholder
value criterion, risk management activities can only be justified to the
extent that they are expected to create a value that will outweighs the
costs.
The work of Modigliani and Miller on firm capital structure (Modigliani
& Miller (1958)) lead to the formulation of a risk management irrele-
vance proposition. The proposition states that hedging cannot create
shareholder value if the cost of bearing risk is the same within a com-
pany, as it is outside the company. In this case there is no reason for
a company to undertake risk management activities, because sharehold-
ers can do this themselves according to their individual preferences at a
similar cost.
The risk management irrelevance proposition is based on the assump-
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tion of perfect capital markets i.e. no transaction costs, no taxes and
no information asymmetries (Fite & Pfleiderer (1995)). For risk man-
agement to create value one or several of the assumptions behind this
proposition must be violated and hence drive a wedge between the cost
of hedging inside and outside the firm. Another formulation is that risk
management at the company level can only be justified by market imper-
fections. Based on such imperfections a series of factors that establish
a link between company specific risk management and shareholder value
have been identified (Stulz (2002)). These factors include:
• Cost of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress
• Cost of Funding New Investments
• Corporate Taxation
• Asymmetric information
Cost of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress: Uncertainty related to
future earnings will generally increase the risk of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
is associated with a series of transaction costs such as legal expenses and
a temporarily inefficient allocation of resources. The expected value of
such costs decrease firm value from the viewpoint of shareholders and
creditors. Creditors charge companies for this type of default risk by
increasing the firms cost of capital during periods of financial distress.
As a result of this companies can create shareholder value by ensuring a
stable cash-flow.
Shareholders cannot eliminate the risk of bankruptcy and hence bankruptcy
cost through individual risk management. The increased cost of capi-
tal during financial distress periods and the cost related to a potential
bankruptcy can only be eliminated through hedging at the firm level.
Risk management is therefore valuable to the company and it’s share-
holders as long the cost of hedging is less than the present value of
expected distress and bankruptcy costs (Stulz (2002)).
Cost of Funding New Investments: Companies create value through
investments in equipment and manpower. The root corporate value is
generally derived from some form of superior know-how about how to
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exploit these investments within the company. Companies will therefore
tend to have more information about future potential earnings of an
investment than their creditors and this form of informational asymmetry
implies that outside an financing of a new investment will tend to be more
expensive than an internal financing through retained cash-flow. Risk
management can therefore create value by ensuring that the company
has sufficient internal cash-flow available to undertake value-enhancing
investments.
Substantial leverage can also lead to situations with asymmetric incen-
tives. For a highly leveraged firm shareholders will benefit from po-
tentially positive outcomes of a risky project whereas debtholders will
pay in case of negative outcome. This form of debt overhang can lead
shareholders to accept risky projects with a negative Net Present Value
(NPV) or debtholders to block risky projects with a positive NPV (Froot
(1994)). This is again a case where a stable cash-flow and the use of re-
tained earnings rather than leverage can help increase shareholder value
by decreasing the possibility of suboptimal investment incentives.
Corporate Taxation: Non-linear tax structures can make risk manage-
ment valuable. Structures where taxes increase with income or limits the
ability to carry tax benefits from losses forward or backward induce an
asymmetrical cost across the cash-flow distribution. This asymmetry will
punish the company both in extreme profit scenarios and in extreme loss
scenarios implying that risk management can increase the expected value
of cash-flows. As taxation is applied to the corporate cash-flows, share-
holders cannot obtain a similar benefit from individual hedging (Fite &
Pfleiderer (1995)).
Asymmetric information: The principal-agent problem between share-
holders and managers can lead to agency costs. Such costs occur when
investors are not convinced that managers are competent or have the
same interests as shareholders and debtholders. Risk management can
help decrease the consequences of such asymmetrical information (Stulz
(2002)).
Several other factors related to leverage, tax and asymmetrical informa-
tion effects can be added to the list. For a comprehensive description
the reader is referred to references such as Fite & Pfleiderer (1995), Ross
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(1996) and Stulz (2002).
Having justified the use of corporate risk management we address the
fundamental distinction between systematic and unsystematic risk in-
troduced through the seminal works of Markowitz (1959) and Sharpe
(1964). Unsystematic risk or idiosyncratic risk describes the firm specific
risk, which investors can remove from their portfolios through diversifi-
cation. Systematic risk is the part of an assets risk that is correlated with
general movements in the global economy and hence cannot be removed
by portfolio diversification. Shareholders will care only about systematic
risk assuming that perfect portfolio diversification can be obtained at the
shareholder level without any transaction costs.
Even if such an idealized setting could be envisioned at the shareholder
level it cannot possibly be assumed to hold for corporations. At the
corporate level unsystematic risks does matter and hedging can create
shareholder value. Furthermore the real-world does present significant
transaction costs both at the corporate and shareholder level. The dis-
tinction between systematic and unsystematic risk is therefore useful
mainly for clarification. Unsystematic risk cannot simply be discarded
as irrelevant, but should by included along with the costs of hedging or
diversification in risk management modelling.
In electricity markets the distinction between systematic vs. unsystem-
atic risk might prove most useful for policy regulation as suggested in
Awerbuch (2000). He suggest that the societal value of renewable energy
technologies is underestimated by traditional engineering models that fail
to take into account diversification effects. The main point is that re-
newables such as wind power and photovoltaics (PV) are less correlated
with the general economic movements than fossil based generation tech-
nologies and are therefore associated with a lower degree of systematic
risk. Society as a whole may be seen as an investor with an extremely
well diversified portfolio and the argument for separation of systematic
and unsystematic risk is therefore more plausible for regulation strategies
than for private investors.
At a general level corporate risk management is justified solely by its
ability to create shareholder value. At a more detailed level it serves sev-
eral functions for different stakeholders. Stakeholders range from small
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shareholder to market markets, creditors, insures and possibly reinsures.
Stakeholder specific characteristics imply that different risk management
policies and methods of risk reporting will benefit different stakeholders
in an unequal fashion. To facilitate an efficient cost of risk transference
between a company and its stakeholders Harris (2002) suggests character-
izing risk by size, quality and direction. Size is measured quantitatively
as the standard deviation or variance of a risk factor. Quality describes
how much the stakeholder is affected by higher moments i.e. fat tails
of a risk factor and direction provides information about the mix of risk
factors. A key point in the analysis of stakeholders is that the kind of risk
reporting desired by one stakeholder can differ widely from that desired
by another.
2.2 The Risk Management Process
Corporate risk management is an elaborate process involving both man-
agerial strategies, organisational aspects and technical modelling (Koll-
berg (2000)). This chapter is confined to a treatment of the technical
modelling aspects of risk management. In Pilipovic (1998) risk manage-
ment is defined as the process of achieving the desired balance between
risk and return through a particular trading strategy. Based on this defi-
nition the term technical modelling can seen as the process of locating an
optimal trading strategy under uncertainty and/or reporting corporate
risk to stakeholders.
The following four steps can be used to describe the general structure of
the construction process for technical risk management modelling1:
1. Choose time horizon and identify relevant risk factors
2. Model size and dependencies between factors
3. Mark to Market (MTM) book exposures
4. Choose risk measure and construct optimization or simulation model
1These steps concern only the construction phase. In the operation phase the
model should be exposed to stress testing and backtesting to ensure the robustness
and quality of the model.
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Electricity markets have special characteristics that affect each of the
steps in the modelling process. Electricity is traded in a series of forward
markets and a real-time market (see chapter 1 for a description of the
nordic market) where prices are formed by a series of fundamental drivers
affecting supply and demand. This special market structure affects risk
factors such as volume fluctuations in demand and production due to
sudden temperature swings or forced outages of generation plants. Iden-
tification of relevant risk factors therefore require a detailed knowledge
about technical constraints in the electricity sector.
Estimating the size and dependencies between risk factors is complicated
by the fact that only a limited amount of data is available in the rela-
tively new electricity markets emerging around the world. Mapping book
(portfolio) exposures to market is also complicated in electricity markets
due to the technical complexities of physical generation assets and retail
portfolios combined with limited set of derivative products and a general
lack of liquidity. Short-term futures do trade with a relatively high liq-
uidity at Nord Pool (NordPool (2002)), however the derivatives required
to replicate a physical asset such as a power plant trade at a low liquidity
when seen as an aggregate.
Finally, based on the justifications for corporate risk management pro-
vided in the previous section there is a discrepancy between risk man-
agement in a value based financial sector and risk management in an
electricity sector where cash-flow or profit is a key performance measure
(Henney & Keers (1998)). This means that risk measures and time hori-
zon for risk measurement cannot be adopted directly from the financial
sector. Such choices must instead be made to reflect the nature of the
corporation and the resulting stakeholder demands for risk reporting.
With respect to time horizon Denton (2003) distinguishes between op-
erational/earnings risk for the short term (less than one month), trad-
ing/financial risk over the intermediate term (one month to one year)
and asset valuation/equity risk for the long term (more than one year).
Although short-term operational decisions and long-term investment de-
cisions affect the cash-flow risk of electricity generators, it is generally
fluctuations in profit seen over the annual accounting period that has the
attention of shareholders.
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In the following subsections we review each of the steps in an electricity
market context by analyzing selected problems and describing references
to relevant literature.
2.2.1 Risk Factors in Electricity Markets
The introduction of competition at both the wholesale and the retail level
has created new risks for electricity market participants. Retailers and
generators serve key functions in retail and wholesale markets and risk
factor identification is therefore described from the viewpoint of these
two players (see figure 1.1).
To provide a framework for identification risks are often categorized by
type. A framework for general business risk is described in EIA (2002)
as:
• Market risk (Interest rates, exchange rates, prices, etc.)
• Credit or default risk (Counterparties failing to meet their obliga-
tions)
• Operational risk (Equipment failure, human errors etc.)
• Liquidity risk (Inability to pay bills, bid/ask spreads)
• Political risk (New regulations, expropriation, etc.)
In Zenios (1993) financial risk is categorized in more detail into as many
as eight distinct types encompassing market, credit and liquidity risk.
The diversity of such categorization is illustrated by Pilipovic (1998)
who suggests market, commodity and human risk as the three primary
risk categories for energy companies. Market and commodity risk over-
lap with the categories listed above. Human risk adds an additional
perspective, describing human errors in both the trading and modelling
process.
Companies can potentially create value from management of risk in all
of these categories. Because this thesis is concerned mainly with the
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technical modelling aspects we choose however to use a relatively simple
framework where risk is categorized through its effect on cost C, price P
and volume Q. The framework is based on the belief that profit or cash-
flow CF=P ·Q−C is the key parameter for corporate risk management
in electricity markets (we elaborate on this in the following subsections).
Generation risk: Electricity can be generated by a mixture of tech-
nologies, which differ considerably with respect to their technical char-
acteristics. Hydro, solar and wind power are driven by stochastic weather
related factors with large volume uncertainties whereas thermal plants
use fossil fuels associated with price uncertainties. The different risks
that arise from different input fuels can however easily be described in
the cost, volume, price risk framework.
Like most corporations, generators face cost risks related to investments,
operations and maintenance etc. To a large extent these factors can
however be controlled by the generator through various technical proce-
dures and insurance contracts known from the pre-liberalization period.
Thermal power plants also face an additional cost risk in terms of price
fluctuations in the fuel markets. Again this is an area where generators
have previous experience and the main new challenge therefore lies with
estimation of the dependencies between fuel prices and other risk fac-
tors. In this context the relationship between natural gas and electricity
prices known as the spark spread SS = Pe−HR ·Pg has received consid-
erable attention in the literature2 Hsu (1998), Fleten, Dobbe & Sigmo
(2003), Deng, Johnson & Sogomonian (2001), Gitelman (2002) or Frayer
& Ulundere (2001).
Interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations represent additional cost
risks and especially exchange rates have gained importance in the Nordic
market where countries with different currencies trade on the common
Nordic power exchange Nord Pool. Finally one can view the risk of
default or credit risk as an additional source of cost uncertainty. However,
since most of the generators revenue is based on electricity prices cleared
by the Nord Pool exchange (NordPool (2003)) this risk is generally not
very large unless the generator engages in significant Over The Counter
(OTC) derivative trading.
2Pe is the electricity price (
 
/kWh), HR is the heat rate (kJ/kWh) and Pg is the
natural gas price (
 
/kJ).
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Volume risk is considerable for electricity generators as a result of the
uncertain nature of weather dependent input for renewable technologies
and the risk of forced outages due to failure in production equipment.
Again volume risk is not a new phenomenon. Liberalization has sim-
ply changed the effect of volume risk, because it now coexists along side
electricity price risk. Aside from the basic premise that negative conse-
quences of risk cannot be passed along the supply chain to consumers,
it is the portfolio effect from dependency between price and volume risk
that makes volume risk a more complex topic in a liberalized markets.
Consider as an example a generator who experiences a forced outage
during a cold winter period where peak load demand has created high
wholesale market prices. If the generator has no financial derivative con-
tracts he will miss out on a significant price spike related income in such
a situation. If the generator has sold forward contracts (i.e. holds a short
position) to hedge his future income, then the situation might be consid-
erably worse. In this case the generator does not simply loose a potential
profit, but incurs an actual financial loss on the short forward position
corresponding to the difference between the spot price and the forward
contract price times the volume contracted. Under normal situations
this loss would be countered by the income from power production.
Unlike cost and volume, the electricity price was previously a regulated
deterministic parameter and hence not a risk factor for electricity genera-
tors. The introduction of wholesale price uncertainty translates directly
into cash-flow risk for the generator and this effect is significant. Not
only because of the dependencies with costs and volume risks, but also
simply because the wholesale price volatility in itself is extreme compared
to levels known from other commodity markets (Clewlow & Strickland
(2000)).
Retailing risk: Retailers serve as a link between the customer and the
wholesale market. Retailers sell a product, which by consumers is valued
through the services that it provides. As such electricity can be said to
have both a quantity dimension and a qualitative dimension. Part of
the qualitative dimension of electricity is that the services (light, heat,
cooling etc.) are available to the consumer on demand at an acceptable
price. As such consumption has an option like character in the sense that
consumers create a demand for the option to consume whenever desired
2.2 The Risk Management Process 23
at a pre-determined fixed strike price. In a competitive market retailers
must create such option contracts to match consumer needs and stay in
business. For the retailers this leads to complex portfolios of electricity
derivatives with values that depend primarily on the wholesale price.
The California crisis provided an example of how crucial the design of
retailer portfolios can be, in the presence of significant wholesale price
risk (Brennan (2001)).
Technical costs are generally not very large in the electricity retailing
business Joskow (2000) and the total cost risk for retailers is dominated
by wholesale price fluctuations. Not only are wholesale price risks in-
dependently large, but they are also correlated with the volume risk of
retailers. Because there are no economical storage possibilities, retail
and wholesale demand must be identical in real-time and consumption is
therefore a primary factor determining wholesale prices. If consumption
turns out to be higher than expected this will have a positive effect on
wholesale prices and vice versa. Volume and cost risk are therefore two
highly dependent factors seen from the retailers point of view.
Price risk is generally low for retailers. The structure of consumer pay-
ments are generally stipulated in advance between the retailer and the
consumer. Price risk is therefore limited to the effect that future compe-
tition will have on the retail price that the retailer can obtain in future
contracts with consumers.
2.2.2 Risk factor modelling
The previous section identified wholesale electricity price fluctuations as
a key risk factor for both retailers and generators. This section describes
risk factor modelling using wholesale electricity prices as a case study.
We discuss different approaches for modelling wholesale electricity prices
as an individual risk factor and briefly discuss directions for future re-
search on the modelling of dependencies between risk factors in electricity
markets.
Different approaches for wholesale electricity price modelling are catego-
rized in Skantze & Ilic (2000) as follows:
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1. Quantitative Modelling of Electricity Prices: The dynamic
properties of electricity prices is modelled as a stochastic process based
on the statistical properties of historical price data and current derivative
prices. Application can be found in references such as Joy (2000) ,Deng
(2000) and Schwartz (1997).
2. Production (Cost) Based Modelling of Electricity Prices:
Expectations about the future variable costs of units in the supply stack
are combined with expectations about future demand to construct price
estimates. Recent references dealing with electricity markets include
Elkraft System (2001), Group (2001) and Botnen (1992).
3. Economic Equilibrium Models of Electricity Prices: Strategic
behavior is incorporated in a cost based model structure using game-
theoretic approaches to calculate economic equilibrium. References Rud-
kevich, Duckworth & Rosen (1998) and Hobbs, Metzler & Pang (2000)
are listed as examples.
4. Agent Based Modelling of Electricity Prices: Market partic-
ipants are divided into groups each with a separate objective function
and set of decision rules. These strategies are used to derive dynamic
price developments. References Visudhiphan & Ilic (1999), Visudhiphan
& Ilic (2000) are listed as examples.
5. Experimental Modelling of Electricity Prices: The market
is simulated through a controlled experiment where a group of people
plays a game with conditions matching those of the market. Prices are
modelled based on the results of the game. Denton, Backerman & Smith
(2001) is listed as a reference.
6. Fundamental Modelling of Electricity Prices: Price dynam-
ics are modelled through the impact of physical and economical price
drivers. Parameters such as general economical trends or temperature
are modelled econometrically using historical data and their effect on
prices is specified within the model. Skantze, Chapman & Ilic (2000)
is listed as an example and after presenting the review of approaches
a detailed model based on this structure in presented in Skantze & Ilic
(2000).
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Weber (2002) presents a similar framework consisting of five categories
separating fundamental, econometric, risk analysis based, game theoretic
and technical analysis based models. Fundamental models, Econometric
models, Risk analysis based models and Game-theoretic models corre-
spond to categories 2, 6, 1 and 4 respectively in Skantze & Ilic (2000).
One can note that risk based or quantitative (category 1) models resem-
ble category 6 models in the sense that stochastic processes are structured
to fit the fundamental characteristic of electricity prices e.g. with a si-
nusoidal function to capture seasonal variation. The two categories are
however distinguished by the fact that category 1 models work directly
with prices and do not include any econometric modelling of underlying
price drivers.
Finally, Weber (2002) adds a new category by including the technical
analysis concept known from finance where statistical analysis of histori-
cal price movements are used to predict future movements. Such models
are related to category 1 models in the sense that no knowledge about
the fundamental aspects of the market is used e.g. price earning ratios
of stocks in financial markets or marginal production costs of generation
units in electricity markets.
Each of these categories have different qualities and disadvantages de-
pending on the amount of data available and the subsequent use the
model. For electricity risk management there has been much focus on
the distinction between the value of financial market data compared to
fundamental data. Paper B employs this distinction to categorize mod-
els as being based on either a fundamental, a financial or a combined
approach depending on the underlying data used.
The distinction between financial and fundamental models is similar to
the distinction between the value of fundamental analysis vs. technical
analysis known from the financial stock markets. Proponents of financial
models subscribe to the ”castles in the air” theory (Malkiel (1983)) where
prices are seen more as a result of crowd psychology than of an actual
valuation of the expected future cash-flow generation of an asset. Pro-
ponents of fundamental analysis believe that prices are a reflection of an
actual cost or value estimation and that future prices can be predicted
through knowledge about the development of underlying price drivers
e.g. marginal production costs, precipitation, demand etc.
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Compared to the framework listed above, categories 2 and 6 can be said
to be fundamentally based price models whereas category 1 models and
models based on the technical analysis approach can be seen as financially
based price models. Category 3 is an example of a combined approach
using both data types whereas category 4 and 5 focus mainly on human
factors rather than fundamental or financial data.
The literature on financially based price models is heavily dominated
by econometric models of the category 1 type and can be divided into
two general approaches. The first approach describes the spot price P (t)
dynamics along with other key state variables using a set of stochastic
processes. These processes are generally spilt into a deterministic com-
ponent f(t) modelling trends and cycles and a stochastic component S(t)
modelling the uncertainty or distribution of prices. The second approach
is based on direct modelling of the dynamic evolution of the entire for-
ward price curve. The two approaches are interrelated as forward prices
can be derived from the risk adjusted or risk neutral version of a spot
price process provided that an explicit solution to the stochastic differen-
tial equation governing the spot price can be obtained analytically (see
Clewlow & Strickland (2000) for an example).
Applications of the spot price approach in electricity markets can be
found in references such as Lucia & Schwartz (2002), De Jong & Huis-
man (2002), Pilipovic (1998), Deng (2000), Kellerhals (2001), Knittel
& Roberts (2000), Barlow (2002), Escribano (2002)and Johnson & Barz
(2000). References that apply the forward price approach to electricity
pricing include Clewlow & Strickland (1999b), Koekebakker & Ollmar
(2001), Clewlow & Strickland (1999a), Bjerksund, Rasmussen & Stens-
land (2000) and Joy (2000).
The main strength of financial models lies with the use of realized market
prices, which include information about a series of non-tangible factors
such as speculation, market power and the general psychology of traders.
The main weakness is the potential lack of predictive power in histor-
ical data especially in the new and dynamically developing electricity
markets.
The main advantage of fundamental models is the ability to represent all
technical conditions in the system including supply, transmission and de-
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mand. Scenarios are easily calculated and data material has historically
been extensively available. After liberalization such data has become
private ownership and hence more limited. However, the main drawback
lies with the process of translating the physical conditions into market
prices. Prices are not necessarily defined by marginal production cost and
factors such as strategic behavior, risk aversion and uncertain demand
responses will induce significant model risk in fundamental models.
Paper B analysis financial based price models in an electricity market
risk management context. A main conclusion from this paper is that
financial models are highly sensitive to the set of historical data used.
This conclusion is exemplified by the strong effect that the inclusion of a
single additional dry year into a data set of six years has on the optimal
solution to a simple profit at risk based risk management problem.
The problems sketched above with financial and fundamental models ex-
plain why practitioners often prefer models that combine the two model
types. Fundamental data contains valuable technical information such as
short-term weather related changes in supply and demand, which gen-
erally cannot be found in market data. Furthermore, the case study
in paper B illustrated that available market data will often provide a
poor representation of long-term conditions e.g. average annual price
scenarios. In the hydro based Nordic market a significant number of
yearly observations would be required to statistically estimate how fluc-
tuations in annual hydrological conditions (wet years vs. dry years) will
affect the average annual price. Unfortunately most of such observa-
tions would tend to lack predictive power by the time that a sufficiently
large sample size became available. On the other hand market price data
such as forward price curves represents important information about the
comprised expectations and risk aversion of market players. This kind of
data cannot be modelled from technical factors in any meaningful way.
An approach that combines the two types of models can be formed by
using a bottom-up model to construct price scenarios and then calibrate
these such that expected prices in the set of scenarios fit the observed
forward price curve in the market3. If desired such calibration can include
extrapolation of patterns found in historical data or parameters inferred
3If arbitrage restrictions are imposed this approach is equivalent to the forward
price curve construction approach suggested in Fleten & Lemming (2003).
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from other derivative prices e.g. volatilities from options.
Having considered each risk factor individually the risk manager must
attempt to capture dependencies between factors. The most widely em-
ployed measure of dependency is the linear correlation. The linear cor-
relation is however an insufficient measure of tail-dependency when the
underlying distributions are non-eliptical. For electricity risk manage-
ment we are highly interested in the tail-dependency, especially between
volume and price risk because concordance between extreme realizations
of these two variables can lead to significant losses for both generators
and retailers. Electricity prices, plant availability and customer demand
are however generally not accurately described by eliptical distributions
and the tail dependency between these factors cannot be adequately de-
scribed by the linear correlation measure4.
The main obstacle for dependency modelling is the lack of data. Har-
ris (2002) states that the uncertainties related to correlations estimates
make even linear correlations estimates of risk factors in the electricity
sector highly inaccurate and suggests a bottom-up modelling of casual re-
lations between key variables and underlying factors as a partial solution.
Although data is a limiting factor electricity generators and retailers can
often limit the number of key risk factors considerably compared to finan-
cial portfolios. The data required for accurate advanced tail dependency
modelling of a limited number of state variables such as plant availability,
electricity spot price, and fuel price data might quickly become available
as the market matures. For a nice introduction to non-linear dependency
modelling in non-eliptical multivariate distributions the reader is referred
to DeMatteis (2001).
Applications of extreme value theory in electricity risk management seems
limited to single factor modelling in the current literature see e.g. Rozario
(2002), Gencay & Selcuk (2002),Khindanova & Atakhanova (2002) and
Bystrom (2001). Capturing the tail-dependency between risk factors is
however essential for risk management in electricity companies and the
use of multivariate extreme value theory in the electricity market will be
an obvious area for future research.
4One can note that even if these variables could be described individually by simple
normal distributions they might still have non-linear dependencies that would lead to
a non-eliptical joint distribution.
2.2 The Risk Management Process 29
2.2.3 Marking a portfolio to market: Hedging vs. Specu-
lation
Marking a book or portfolio to market is the process of valuing a port-
folio based on all available market information. Risk management is
concerned with the potential change in portfolio value between today T1
and some future time reference T2 and marking a portfolio to market
therefore involves both an estimation of the current market value of the
portfolio and the future variability of the market value between T1 and
T2 (Clewlow & Strickland (2000)).
The market value is an essential part of financial risk management, be-
cause it shows the true value of the portfolio in the sense that this is the
value that can be realized as cash-flow by selling the portfolio in the mar-
ket. Any attempt to value a portfolio differently than what is dictated
by the market will conflict with the hypothesis of efficient markets and
hence involve speculation. Decision makers can choose to speculate if
they believe they have superior information, however such action should
be separated from risk management and operational planning strategies
to avoid accidental speculation. As a basic principle all non-speculative
decisions such as risk management, operational planning and investment
decisions should be based on market value maximization rather than
expected profit maximization (Fleten (2002)).
Electricity cannot be economically stored and forward contracts there-
fore constitute the main building block for replication of more complex
derivatives. Electricity is traded in hourly time blocks at the Nord Pool
exchange, however the forward price curve will generally not be complete
i.e. an individual hour occurring n > 36 hours ahead cannot be traded
at the Nord Pool exchange. Instead a limited number of block products
is traded. The block nature of forward contracts implies that the market
will price a series of averages rather than individual hourly prices.
For a series of decision problems such as e.g. valuation of a generation
plant, an investor require more detailed information about forward prices
(in principle a price for every hour during the plant’s lifetime). To solve
this problem, paper A in this thesis suggests an approach that allows
the decision maker to combine exogenous fundamental information with
market data to create a high resolution forward price curves that obeys
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the arbitrage bands imposed by the market prices of the traded forward
block products. Figure 2.1 illustrates how price scenarios from a bottom-
up model can be combined with block price data to form a smooth high
resolution forward price curve.

































Optimized forward price curve and MPS Optimized
MPS
Figure 2.1: Fitting a smooth high resolution forward price curve through
a combination of market data and expected price scenarios from the MPS
bottom-up model.
In relation to the description of electricity price modelling one can note
that this approach is similar to the suggested combined approach for
spot price modelling where the scenarios in the spot price model are
calibrated to market data to ensure that the expected prices match the
forward market prices. This approach indicates that it is possible to use
price and hence profit for risk management rather than value without
violating the basic criteria of value maximization.
Let ft denote the price
5 of a forward contract with delivery during a
5At the time of writing there is no cash-flow outlay from either buyer or seller of a
forward contract so in this context price will refer to the settlement price written in
the forward contract.
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single hour t and let F (T1, T2) be the price of a block forward contract
with delivery in the interval [T1, T2]. With this notation we can define
the arbitrage relation between the products as follows (Bjerksund et al.
(2000)):







The block forward price F (T1, T2) is calculated as a weighted average
of a series of forward prices ft over the interval [T1, T2]. Since we do
not observe exact prices but rather a bid/ask spread in the market the
equality condition should be replaced by the following:





e−rtft ≤ F (T1, T2)ask (2.2)
Notice that the arbitrage bands are not between spot and forward prices
but rather between a block forward and the hourly forwards within that
block. The arbitrage argument is based on storability and can be used to
relate the block forwards to sub-period blocks only because both products
are storable. The arbitrage argument states that if cash can be borrowed
or invested over time at a rate r then the cash-flows of a block forward
contract can be replicated by a portfolio of hourly forward contracts
and a cash-flow account. The cash-flow account is used to eliminate
the differences in hourly cash-flows between the block contract and the
portfolio of hourly contracts. If F is larger than the righthand side of
equation 2.2 then an arbitrage profit can be made by buying the hourly
forwards, selling the block and using the cash-flow account to replicate
cash-flows differences between the two. Similar and arbitrage profit is
made by selling the hourly forwards and buying the block if F is smaller
than the righthand side of equation 2.2.
The general arbitrage relation for storable commodities can be written
as:
F (T0, T1) = S(T0)(1 + r)
T1 + CY + SC (2.3)
where S is the spot price, r is the interest rate, SC represents storage
costs and CY is the convenience yield describing any potential benefits
from holding the physical commodity in storage rather than the forward
contract. This type of arbitrage argument brakes down in real time elec-
tricity markets, because electricity cannot be stored in any economically
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viable manner. Hydro power can to some extent provide a means of stor-
age for producers, however it is limited by the production capacity of the
plant (Skantze & Ilic (2001)) and the annual planning cycle of reservoir
filling.
In Gjolberg & Johnsen (2001) a spot-futures price relation for hydro
producers is provided:
F (T0, T1) = S(T0)(1 + r)
T1 + CY + P (Rl(T1) > Rcap)E[S(T1)] (2.4)
Where in the final term on the right hand side P denotes probability,
Rl is the reservoir level at time T0 and Rcap is the maximum reservoir
capacity. The term can be seen as the storage costs for hydro power. It
is the probability of a spill at time T1 times the expected value of power
at time T1. At low reservoir levels this term is close to zero whereas it
equals the expected spot price when reservoir is full and water is spilled.
The second term is the convenience yield, which depends on the risk
of running the reservoir dry. Again this a term that depends on the
expected future spot price, because running dry implies a financial loss
that depends on the difference between the prices that occur in period
when the reservoir is empty and the prices that prevailed when the water
used to sell power in the market.
The literature on forward pricing is centered around two main theories
describing the relationship between spot and forward prices. The first ap-
proach is based on the arbitrage theory expressed in equation 2.2 whereas
the second approach focus on the relationship between the forward price
and the expected future spot price. If an investor is risk neutral he
should be indifferent between a bet that provides a price F (T0, T1) with
certainty and any uncertain bet that has an expected price equal to
F (T0, T1). Any deviation between the two terms F (T0, T1) and E[S(T1)]
can therefore be seen as a risk premium RP required by the market as
an aggregate. In mathematical notation we can write:
F (T0, T1) = ET0 [S(T1)](1 + r)
T1 + RP (2.5)
Justification for a non-zero risk premium can be found in the relationship
between hedgers and speculators on the supply and demand side of the
market. Speculators demand a risk premium whereas hedgers are willing
to pay a risk premium. If there are more hedgers on the supply side
then forwards will tend to sell above the expected spot price and vice
2.2 The Risk Management Process 33
versa. Paper E in this thesis uses this type of argument to analyze the
potential sign of risk premiums in a market for tradable green certificates
in a market where the supply side consists mainly of wind turbines.
Audun, Arnob & Marija (2002) examines the expected value theory of
the spot-futures price relationship for the Nordic electricity market and
finds empirical evidence for a significant negative risk premium during
the period 1996 to 2001. These results are however strongly influenced
by the hydrological conditions during the period. As an example the
year 2000 was a very wet year with a low annual average price. If the
futures price is an unbiased estimate of future prices, then it should have
overestimated the realized spot price in 2000 as result of the realized
hydrological conditions rather than because of a negative risk premium
as would be suggested by equation 2.5. To make valid conclusions about
the market risk premium and the expected value hypothesis the sample
must reflect the distribution of annual hydrological conditions in the
Nordic market i.e. the distribution of wet vs. dry years. The six year
sample used in the study does not seem to satisfy this requirement.
With respect to short-term contracts Audun et al. (2002) finds a signifi-
cant negative risk premium and suggests asymmetric short-term flexibil-
ity on the supply and demand side (demand less flexible) as a possible
explanation. Gjolberg & Johnsen (2001) works with approximately the
same data set and attribute similar findings to informational inefficien-
cies in the market. The fact that hydro producers tend to use funda-
mental models that do not include price information from the market is
suggested as a possible explanation.
Longstaff & Wang (2002) examines the expected value relation in equa-
tion 2.5 on day-ahead forward price data from the PJM market in the
US. Examining percentage risk premiums for each of 24 hourly day-ahead
forward contracts he finds jointly significant average risk premiums. The
positive risk premiums are however a result of positive skewness in the
hourly spot price distributions due to large price spikes and the medians
of hourly risk premiums are therefore generally negative. The study con-
cludes that the forward premium represents compensation for bearing
the risk of rare catastrophic shocks in electricity prices.
The key lesson from this section is that electricity risk managers should
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maximize the value of the firm rather than the expected profit to avoid
accidental speculation against the market. As we illustrate in the follow-
ing section, this does not mean that risk management should necessarily
focus on the value distributions rather than profit distributions. Mar-
ket data is limited in electricity markets and the effect of factors such
as transaction costs, volume risk and lack of liquidity are generally not
priced in the market. To capture such effects the electricity risk manager
must resort to profit/loss distributions. This does not however contradict
with the marking to market principle or the maximization of shareholder
value criterion as long as profit distributions are calibrated to all suffi-
ciently liquid market data.
2.2.4 Risk measures and modelling framework
In a financial risk management context, risk measures are used to assist
in the ranking of choices by translating profit/loss distributions into com-
parable units. The most prominent example of such a unit is the concept
of utility put forth by Neumann & Morgenstern (1953) through a famous
set of axioms. If a risk manager accepts these axioms, then consistent
and rational decisions must be based on expected utility maximization.
The utility theory requires that the decision maker can express his utility
function, which is often problematic. Some basic guidelines can generally
be accepted e.g. ∂U(x)/∂x ≥ 0 (increasing i.e. more is preferred to less)
and ∂2U(x)/∂x2 ≤ 0 (concave i.e. risk aversion), but the functional
form and exact parameter values of a utility function are generally not
easily estimated. One possible approach is to deduce the utility function
through the previous actions of a decision maker. However, the data
required for such a process is extensive and practical applications are
limited by the lack of sufficient data material.
The concept of stochastic dominance can be used to compare density
functions and hence eliminate the need to explicitly estimate the specific
form of a utility function. Let G(x) and F (x) be distribution functions
defined on the closed interval [a, b]. F (x) is said to stochastically first
order dominate G(x) if F (x) ≤ G(x) ∀x ∈ [a, b]. Furthermore F (x)
stochastically second order dominate G(x) if the area under F (x) is less
than or equal to the area under G(x) for all x between a and b, i.e.
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∫ u
a F (x)dx ≤
∫ u
a G(x)dx ∀u ∈ [a, b]. Second order stochastic dominance
(SSD) is a necessary and sufficient condition for expected utility maxi-
mization provided that investors have increasing concave utility functions
(Yoshiba & Yamai (2001)). A drawback with the stochastic dominance
concept is that it only provides a partial ordering of density functions.
Not all density functions can be ranked according to stochastic domi-
nance and the concept also fails to provide an absolute measure of risk
(Guthoff (1997)).
In our definition of risk management modelling we defined a two-fold
objective as the location of an optimal trading strategy and reporting
of risk to stakeholders. Neither utility functions nor stochastic dom-
inance provide the decision maker with a measure that fulfil both of
these objectives by ranking all portfolio combinations and reporting risk
to shareholders in a satisfactory manner. Practitioners and academics
have therefore turned attention towards more simple indices such as the
”At Risk” measures. The original Value at Risk measure V aRα that has
become an industry standard in the financial sector is defined simply as
a percentile of a value distribution for a given portfolio over a given time
horizon. This definition includes three parameters; a percentile α, the
value related to that percentile V aRα and a time horizon ∆T :
V aRα = sup{x|F (x) ≤ α} (2.6)
where F (x) is the cumulative distribution function of a profit variable x.
Though VaR may seem like an extremely simple risk measure the cal-
culation behind VaR and the analyzes of its theoretical properties are
relatively complex tasks. The three basic approaches for calculating
VaR are the Variance-Covariance approach, historical simulation and
Monte Carlo-simulation (Ku (2001)). Recently a fourth approach based
on Extreme Value Theory (EVT) have gained momentum as a tool for
improved modelling of tail behavior in the distribution. Recent refer-
ences to applications of the EVT approach in energy markets include
Bystrom (2001) who applies extreme value theory to Nord Pool spot price
return series pre-filtered by an AR-GARCH model and Khindanova &
Atakhanova (2002) who compare VaR estimates of oil, gas and electric-
ity prices based on normal and stable distributions. An introduction to
these four approaches for VaR calculation and an empirical comparison
can be found in Gencay & Selcuk (2002).
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With respect to theoretical properties Artzner (1999) has provided a set
of axioms for risk measures. These axioms establish a framework for
analyzing risk measures and as exemplified in Acerbi & Tasche (2001)
risk measures that fail these axioms give lead to perverse incentives for
risk managers and paradoxical solutions to decision problems.
Given a risky portfolio Z a risk measure ρ(Z) is said to be coherent if it
satisfies the following four properties:
• Translational invariance : ρ(Z + c) = ρ(Z) + c for constant c ∈ <
• Subadditivity : ρ(Z1 + Z2) ≤ ρ(Z1) + ρ(Z2)
• Positive homogeneity : ρ(bZ) = bρ(Z) for constant b ∈ <+
• Monotonicity : ∀Z, Y with Z ≤ Y , we have ρ(Z) ≤ ρ(Y )
Translational invariance: This property implies that by adding an
amount c of cash to the initial portfolio and investing it in a risk free
account, the risk measure will be decreased by c (when measured as a
loss). This property establishes the risk free cash account as a reference
for the comparison of risky portfolios.
Subadditivity: The subadditivity implies that the risk of a portfolio
is at most equal to the sum of the separate risks of any set of subset of
portfolios. It relates to the key concept of diversification in risk man-
agement by expressing that portfolio diversification cannot lead to an
increase of the risk measure. It also implies that mergers cannot increase
risk. If this property did not hold for a risk measure, investors could
decrease risk by splitting trading operations into separate smaller units.
The subadditivity is therefore essential for risk regulation as a measure
without this property would tend to underestimate the aggregate market
risk.
Positive homogeneity: This property implies that the risk of a posi-
tion is directly proportional to its size i.e. n small positions of size m
have the same risk as one large position of size nm. If this property
did not hold individual companies could decrease their risk measure by
splitting or merging portfolios into identical artificial legal units.
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Monotonicity: This property implies that if a portfolio has systemati-
cally lower returns than another portfolio then it must be more risky.
In a Gaussian world risk is fully described by the variance, which is a
subadditive measure. Risk measures including VaR are therefore propor-
tional to the variance in a Gaussian setting and hence subadditive (Acer-
bia, Nordio & Sirtori (2001)). VaR is however generally not subadditive
in a non-Gaussian setting and is therefore not a coherent risk measure
when applied to the non-Gaussian distributions observed in electricity
risk management problems.
The Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) or Expected Shortfall (ES) mea-
sure has been proposed by Artzner (1999) and multiple others as a coher-
ent substitute for VaR. VaR focusses on the number of times a threshold
is exceeded, but is unaffected by the actual size of the losses beyond the
threshold. CVaR focus on the average loss in the tail and is hence sensi-
tive to both the probability and the size of a loss beyond the threshold.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the VaR and CVaR measures.
CVaR was originally used to express the average loss in the α tail of a
distribution (see figure 2.2). For continuous distributions this definition
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is relatively straightforward and can be written as:
ESα(x) = −E[x|x ≤ V aRα] (2.7)
Where x is a profit variable i.e. negative x indicates a loss. For discrete
distributions the definition becomes more subtle and this has unfortu-
nately lead to some confusion in the terminology. Acerbi & Tasche (2002)
provides a distinction between Tail Conditional Expectation (TCE), Worst
Conditional Expectation (WCE) and Expected Shortfall (ES). In most
literature expected shortfall is associated with equation 2.7, however by
the more exact definitions of Acerbi & Tasche (2002) the two measures
are different. To minimize confusion we prefer the notation used in Rock-
afeller & Uryasev (2002) where CVaR describes the average loss in the
α-tail distribution defined as:
Fα(x) =
{
0 ∀x > V aRα
[F (x)− α]/[1 − α] ∀x ≤ V aRα
(2.8)
For distributions with discontinuities at the VaR threshold the definition
of the CVaR measure is expanded with CVaR+ and CVaR−, which are
defined by substituting α in equation 2.8 with α+ and α− respectively.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the definition of α+, α+ and α respectively, for a
discontinuous distribution function F (x).
With this specification CVaR is a coherent risk measure under general
conditions. In relation to other terminology CVaR+ is often referred to as
the mean shortfall whereas CVaR− is known as the tail-VaR. Strengths
and weaknesses of VaR and CVaR are summarized in table 2.1 from ana-
lyzes in Yamai & Yoshiba (2002), Guthoff (1997), Rockafeller & Uryasev
(2000) and Yoshiba & Yamai (2001)
Strength/Weakness VaR CVaR
Coherent risk measure - +
Easily subjected to backtesting + -
Related to firms default probability + -
Considers losses beyond VaR - +
Easily applicable to portfolio optimization - +
Consistent with SSD - +
Table 2.1: Strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) of the VaR and CVaR risk
measures
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of α+, α+ and α for a discontinuous distribution
function.
Emerging literature seems to favor the CVaR measure especially for use
at the regulatory level. Jaschke (2001) argues that the main argument for
bank regulation with CVaR rather than VaR lies with the fact that the
main objective of regulatory supervision is to prevent costly bankrupt-
cies. Since the Value at Risk measure is indifferent to losses above the
VaR level, it leads investors towards strategies that promise a relatively
high expected return, but contain the probability (typically very small) of
very large losses. When the objective of regulation is to avoid bankrupt-
cies such an effect this is clearly undesirable (Jaschke (2001)) and (Yamai
& Yoshiba (2002)).
Artzner (1999) note that both VaR and CVaR leave out valuable infor-
mation both about losses below (smaller losses) the VaR threshold level
and about higher moments of losses above (larger losses) the threshold.
To alleviate this problem Wang (2002) suggests a family of coherent risk
measures based on probability distortions that employ the whole loss
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distribution6.
With respect to the suitability of risk measures in electricity markets we
note that the objectives of risk management are similar to those found
in financial markets. The cost of bankruptcies and financial distress are
main arguments for hedging both with respect to the corporate perspec-
tive and the regulatory perspective. Currently there is no regulation of
electricity companies, however given the essential role of electricity based
services in society such regulation could be warranted if future specula-
tive bankruptcies threaten the security of supply. The application of
of CVaR in electricity markets is therefore an obvious area for future
empirical applied research.
Profit vs. Value: Although the objective of both risk regulation and
company specific risk management are similar in electricity markets and
financial markets, the appropriate unit for risk measurement is different.
Banks and insurance companies need to invest their funds, but the prof-
itability of these investments are generally dependent on the companies
core business i.e. the sale of insurance of bank accounts. The financial
markets are furthermore highly liquid and investments can generally be
liquidated at a short notice without significant transaction costs. In such
an environment value is the relevant measure for risk, because it reflects
the cash-flow that could be realized to meet obligations by selling the
portfolio.
The situation is different for electricity companies. Investments in gen-
eration plants, manpower or other forms of equipment are investments
that are part of the companies core business. Such assets cannot simply
be replaced by other assets because their profitability arises as a result of
company know how. Furthermore assets such as power plants are gener-
ally not traded in the market and the position cannot be liquidated at a
short notice without considerable costs. Market value is a less useful unit
for risk management in such an environment since it no longer represents
the cash-flow that could be realized by selling the portfolio.
Volume risk and liquidity risk are described in Henney & Keers (1998)
as the primary factors that affect value without being priced by the
6A distorted probability distribution is simply a function g(F(x)) of the original
distribution function F(x) mapping percentiles to reals.
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market. Volume risk occurs due to forced outages and demand swings
which are highly correlated with the wholesale spot price. Liquidity
risk occurs because companies cannot replicate their physical assets with
sufficiently liquid derivatives on a continuous basis. As an illustrative
example we consider again the financial replication of a thermal power
plant through a series of spark spread options. An analytical formula
for the spark spread option for a future time period T based on forward
contract replication was provided by Deng et al. (2001):

























Where Fe(t, T ) and Fg(t, T ) are forward prices at time t for the period
T of electricity and natural gas respectively, σ2e(s) and σ
2
g(s) are the
variance for a contract with maturity s for electricity and natural gas
respectively, σ2s(s) is the total spark spread variance, ρ is the linear cor-
relation coefficient between electricity and natural gas for maturity s,
HR is the heat rate and r is the risk free interest rate. The use of for-
ward contracts is made necessary by the non-storable nature of electricity,
which prevents replication strategies based on borrowing and storage of
electricity.
This analytical spark spread formula represents a highly stylized descrip-
tion of a power plant that fails to take a series of important factors into
account. First of all it is based on the assumption that forward prices
are accurately described by a normal distribution. Numerous empirical
studies including Johnson & Barz (2000), De Jong & Huisman (2003)
and Joy (2000) indicate that this is not the case in electricity markets.
Denton (2003) that current state of the art analytical models fail to
take operational limitations such as rate limits, start up costs and non-
linear heat rate characteristics into account. Analytical approaches also
fail to include volume risk and liquidity risk. Although it might be
possible to replicate a power plant at time t1 for some future time interval
[t3; t4] using the relevant futures contracts on electricity and gas, there
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is no guarantee that the market will be sufficiently liquid to allow for
an accurate rebalancing of this portfolio at t2. Furthermore there is no
analytical way of including volume risk unless a liquid insurance market
for this specific type of risk exists.
A series of risk measures based on cash-flow rather than value have been
suggested for electricity companies. These measure have different names
such as Profit at Risk (PaR), Earnings at Risk (EaR) and Cash-Flow
at Risk (CFaR), however they all focus on the fact that cash-flow is a
more relevant variable for electricity market risk management than value
(Ku (2001)). By using these measures in a discrete state space frame-
work solved by dynamic programming techniques as described in Denton
(2003) one can include the factors listed above. When the scenario tree
is made consistent with the value maximization criterion by calibrating
expected profit scenarios to forward market prices PaR can be seen as
an extension of VaR. All the market data that would be used to calcu-
late VaR is included, but the information set is expanded to include the
factors not priced by the market.
Paper B in this thesis discusses the use of the PaR measure and examines
how the PaR measure is affected by the modelling of various parameters
such as volume risk and price spikes for a simple risk management prob-
lem of an electricity generator.
Simulation vs. Optimization: A basic classification in mathematical
modelling is the distinction between normative models and descriptive
models. The two main objectives of risk management lead to a similar
distinction between optimization models and simulation models. Opti-
mization models are normative and directed towards the location of a
strategy based on some criteria of optimality and a set of constraints.
In risk management the optimization will typically involve the location
of a portfolio that maximizes profit in the face of risk constraints or
minimizes risk subject to constraints on the expected profit. Simulation
models are descriptive and are typically used to report the risk of a com-
panies portfolio either internally or to stakeholders. If risk limits are
exceeded action can then be taken based on more qualitative analysis
or a subsequent run with either an optimization model or a simulation
models with different parameters.
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Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk are generally expressed as
risk limits. In simulation models the measures are derived from the set
of scenarios used and can be directly compared to the predefined limits.
The advantages of simulation is that many parameters and scenarios can
be included to give a detailed representation of both the size and de-
pendencies between risk factors. We can thus get an accurate measure
of PaR or VaR for a specific portfolio. The main drawback is of course
that simulation does not provide information about the optimal portfo-
lio or strategy. Optimization models allow for a comparison of different
portfolio combinations or strategies, but the mathematical complexity
constrains the number of parameters and scenarios and hence the accu-
racy by which the risk measures can be calculated.
Optimization with Value at Risk is made particularly difficult by the
non-linear and non-convex nature of the risk measure (Gaivoronski &
Pflug (2001)), (Rockafeller & Uryasev (2000)). If input factors are mod-
elled by analytical distributions then VaR can for special cases be calcu-
lated analytically. Such analytical models are however generally highly
constrained in terms of distributional assumptions and tend to lack the
flexibility required to model all relevant parameters for electricity risk
management.
Discrete scenario tree approaches based on stochastic programming and
dynamic programming principles represent the primary alternatives to
analytical models. VaR is however mathematically problematic in such
models as it leads to integer or mixed integer programming problems.
Contrary to VaR optimization problems it is shown in Rockafeller &
Uryasev (2000) that CVaR optimization can be solved as a Linear Pro-
gramming (LP) problem. The LP approach is expanded to handle dis-
crete distributions where jumps occur at the VaR threshold and optimiza-
tion problems with CVaR constraints in Rockafeller & Uryasev (2002)
and Krokhmal, Palmquist & Uryasev (2002). A key aspect of the ap-
proach is that CVaR can be optimized without an explicit calculation of
VaR. Furthermore one will always obtain a solution with a conservative
VaR since CVaR ≥ VaR by definition (see figure 2.2). The LP feature
of CVaR optimization makes CVaR suitable for discrete state space ap-
proaches, where the size of the discrete scenario tree tends to be the main
limiting factor with respect to tractability.
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The author is not aware of any literature applying CVaR or VaR opti-
mization to electricity risk management problems. Taking into account
the size of losses beyond a VaR level is however equally relevant for
electricity generators and retailers as for financial companies and ap-
plications of profit based versions of the CVaR measure is therefore an
obvious future development for electricity market risk management.
Paper B in the thesis examines a simple PaR optimization problem where
a generator attempts to hedge a long call option on electricity using a
short forward position. By looking at payoff diagrams of the combined
portfolio the paper illustrates that PaR is a convex function of the for-
ward hedge used as decision variable. Results of this type can be used to
create solution algorithms and an analytical analysis of payoff diagrams
can therefore help increase the size of PaR problems, which can be solved
to optimality.
2.3 Concluding remarks
This chapter has reviewed basic risk management theory and recent liter-
ature addressing problems specific to risk management in the electricity
sector. The chapter has also explained how the research papers A and B




capacity and security of
supply
One of the primary benefits from liberalization and the introduction of
real-time pricing is a potential reduction in the amount of production
capacity. This expected reduction is based on an increased demand flex-
ibility and more scrutiny in the investment decisions in a system where
market participants are exposed directly to real-time prices and the fi-
nancial consequences of their decisions. The potential gain will depend
on the market’s ability to outperform regulators by providing incentives
to investors that more accurately reflect the preferences of consumers.
Electricity is a private good in its quantity dimension. This implies that
property rights for a unit of electricity can be assigned to an individual
consumer and once consumed the unit cannot be consumed by others.
Electricity is not valued by consumers solely through its quantitative di-
mension, but rather through the services that it provides. Most electric-
ity dependent services are based on a preceding planning process where a
stable supply of electricity is assumed available at request. This implies
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that electricity is also valued by consumers through a quality dimension1
in terms of supply security.
Proponents of liberalization have long argued that regulation has lead
to overcapacity due to a one sided focus on reliability at the expense of
economic efficiency. The market price signal must provide incentives for
new investments in a liberalized market and the key question is therefore
whether or not market prices will be able to more accurately reflect
consumer preferences in terms of both security of supply and economic
efficiency. The shift in the investment decision making process from
regulators to private investors have placed new demands on those decision
makers that are affected by the electricity price. This chapter reviews
the consequences of this shift from three different perspectives:
1. The individual investor perspective: How are investment decisions
made in a liberalized electricity market?
2. The market perspective: How can models of market equilibrium be
adapted to fit the characteristics of a liberalized setting?
3. The regulators perspective: How will different models for regula-
tion of the capacity balance affect security of supply and economic
efficiency in the long term?
3.1 The investor perspective
The papers of this thesis that deal with investments in generation capac-
ity (C,D and E), focus mainly on market modelling and the perspective
of the regulator. The individual investor’s perspective is reviewed in this
section, because it introduces some basic aspects of theory that are re-
quired to properly analyze market equilibrium models and models for
regulation of the capacity balance. For a more elaborate analysis of
the investor perspective the reader is referred to Murto (2003) or Deng
(1999).
1Environmental aspects can be seen as an additional component of the quality
dimension, however the issue of regulation in this area is an elaborate topic in itself
and is considered outside the scope of this thesis.
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Traditional investment theory based on the Net Present Value (NPV)
framework values an investment opportunity as the sum of expected
future cash-flows discounted for the time value of money and possible also
the effect of risk. In an uncertain environment management will however
often have the ability to react to new information as it arrives over time
and hence optimize the timing of its decisions. Modern investment theory
recognizes that such flexibility creates a non-negative option value and
that traditional approaches that fail to incorporate such effects tend to
underestimate project value (Trigeorgis (1995)).
The distinction between risk adjustment and the value of flexibility is
fundamental in investment theory. Both aspects depend on the level of
uncertainty, but typically in reverse directions. Investors are generally
assumed to be risk averse implying that increased uncertainty will de-
crease project value. The option value of flexibility2 is a non-decreasing
function of the volatility and uncertainty will therefore not necessarily
have a negative effect on project value. The effect is ambiguous with a
sign that depends on the tradeoff between the effect of risk version and
managerial flexibility.
The two main techniques used for valuation in modern investment the-
ory are contingent claim analysis and dynamic programming (Dixit &
Pindyck (1994)). Contingent claim analysis is based on the arbitrage
principle where a non-traded project is valued as the present value (dis-
counted for time value of money at the risk free rate of return) of a port-
folio of traded assets that exactly matches the cash-flow of the project
in all stages and potential states. If such a replicating portfolio exists
the market is said to be complete and the contingent claim analysis pro-
vides both a value and a replicating strategy for the investment problem
(Smith & Nau (1995)). The dynamic programming approach does not
require the existence of a complete market and includes the investor’s
subjective valuation of risk either by discounting cash-flows at a risk
adjusted rate or by using a utility function as the objective.
In complete markets it is possible to separate the investment decision
and the financing decision. When the dynamic programming approach
is formulated as a decision tree approach with a utility function repre-
2Seen as the difference between the values of a project with and without the op-
tionality (Wallace (1999)).
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senting the subjective level of risk aversion, it provides the same project
value and replicating strategy as the contingent approach regardless of
the utility function used. The solution to the investment problem is
therefore identical to the solution sound by a contingent claim approach,
however in return for the additional input provided the dynamic pro-
gramming also calculates an optimal strategy for the financing decision
(Smith & Nau (1995)). The ability to separate the financing and invest-
ment decision breaks down in incomplete markets where all risks of a
project cannot be replicated. In this case contingent claim analysis can
only produce upper and lower bounds on the project value with intervals
that depend on the amount of risk that can be hedged in the market.
Project risks related to electricity and fuel prices can to some extent
be hedged in Nordic electricity market through a portfolio of forward
contracts. A series of papers have used the forward based replication
strategy presented in Deng et al. (2001) to value power plants, based on
the assumption that the investment is affected only by these two factors
(see e.g. Frayer & Ulundere (2001) or Hsu (1998)). Examples of more
detailed contingent claim applications include Fleten et al. (2003) who
calculates the value of gas fired power plants with CO2 capture facilities
taking while into account the option values of operating flexibility and
the ability to postpone the investment. Murto (2003) examines the ef-
fect of input fuels uncertainty on the optimal timing of an irreversible
investment choice between either a fossil fuel fired plant or a biomass
fired plant.
Finally, Deng (2000) and Deng & Oren (2003) introduce a contingent
claim based framework for pricing of electricity derivatives based on an
underlying spot price process that can include factors such as mean-
reversion, seasonality, spikes or jumps. Although it is not explicitly
stated in the two papers, the market for such risks is not complete,
and the formulas are therefore based on the assumption of risk neutral
investors. Market completeness is not a general characteristic that can
be attributed to a market, but rather a concept that must be evaluated
for each specific project. The electricity market might be considered
complete for some investment opportunities and incomplete for other
depending on whether or not cash-flows can be replicated in all future
states and stages.
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The risk factors that affect the cash-flow stream generated by a power
plant were reviewed in detail in Chapter 2 and can be classified as either
price risk, volume risk and cost risk. For valuation it is generally not
sufficient that these risk factors can be hedged using financial assets
in the market, because real assets such as power plants are associated
with transaction costs and technical constraints that change the cash-
flow stream compared to a financial portfolio. Examples of technical
constraints that can affect the flexibility value and operation costs of a
gas fired power plant include: Hourly minimum and maximum operating
ranges, Limitations on ramp rates, Cycle times constraints, Maximum
number of cycles during a period, Startup and shutdown times and costs,
Relationship between heat rate and output level (Dorris & Dunn (1999)).
Models that fail to incorporate technical constraints into the valuation
procedure will tend to over estimate the value of investment projects in
empirical applications (Denton (2003)). Deng (2003) use a trinomial tree
solved by backward dynamic programming to incorporate operational
characteristic such as startup/shut-down costs, ramp-up times and out-
put dependent heat-rate into the real option valuation of a power plant.
Denton (2003) describes a similar approach, but notes that the method-
ology requires the assumption of risk neutrality. Deng & Oren (2003)
expands the framework to account for price spikes in the spot price pro-
cess by using the analytical formulas derived in Deng (2000). Although
these methods are based on dynamic programming they avoid the issue
of subjective risk preferences through the assumption of risk neutrality.
When the market is incomplete and investors are risk averse the model
must include information about subjective risk preferences. To model
the investment decision in such a setting Siddiqi (2000) use a decision
tree approach where a utility function describes the investor’s subjective
risk preference. The arguments proposed in chapter 1 against the use
utility functions for risk management can however be transferred to the
case of investment decisions. Long-term investments in production ca-
pacity should enter into the firms general risk management framework
and Value at Risk based measures would therefore be more appropriate
for modelling of the firm’s risk preferences. A series of NPV based meth-
ods termed CFaR, PVaR and RPV, have been suggested for this purpose
(Shimko (2001)).
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Assuming a setup with two time periods, the Cash Flow at Risk method
(CFaR)3 calculates a certainty equivalent by subtracting a risk charge


















VCFaR represents the present value computed with the CFaR approach,
µt is the expected cash-flow at time t, σt is the standard deviation of
cash-flows at time t, and zt is the number of standard deviations used to
define risk capital4 and the parameter k is a risk charge expressing the
investor’s level of risk aversion. The CFaR approach neglects correlations
between the cash-flows in different time steps ρ12. The Present Value at
Risk (PVaR) approach includes the effect of correlation by delaying the
risk adjustment until after the discounting of cash-flows:












If cash flows are uncorrelated between time steps then the two measures
CFaR and PVaR are identical.
Shimko (2001) expands the methodology by including the effect that
arises as uncertainty is resolved over time. For the two period example
this implies that if some uncertainty about period 2 cash-flows is resolved
during periods 1, then this should be reflected in the valuation. Techni-
cally this implies discounting a larger amount of risk capital in the first
year and a smaller amount in the second year. The approach is termed
3The CFaR approach described here should not be confused with the VaR measures
discussed in chapter 2 although the terminology might coincide.
4This simplified example assumes that cash-flows follow a distribution, such as the
Gaussian, completely defined by the first two moments.
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Risk-adjusted Present Value (RPV) and takes the following form:















2 − ρσ2σ1)1/2 (3.6)
k∗ = k/(1 + r + k). (3.7)
The three approaches all share the need for exogenous specification of an
investor specific risk aversion parameter k. A key question is therefore
whether or not decision makers will be able to specify a k that fits their
subjective risk preferences. Furthermore the framework only takes risk
and not option values into account. A logical expansion would therefore
be to implement the RPV approach in a decision tree context.
3.2 The market perspective
The models described in the previous section assume the electricity price
to be an exogenous input parameter. While this may be sufficient from
the individual investor’s perspective, many decision problems require a
description of the interaction between investments and price formation
in the market over a long-term perspective.
The different categories for electricity price modelling described in chap-
ter 2 illustrates the diversity in modelling approaches. Models that in-
clude technical bottom-up data are often preferable when the objective
is to analyze the long-run dependency between investments and prices,
rather than modelling of prices alone. Our focus here will be on partial
equilibrium models, which estimate equilibrium in the long-run through
bottom-up modelling of demand, supply and technical constraints. Par-
tial equilibrium models are based on the same data set used in category
2 models, but provide a flexible framework as they can be expanded to
include elements from categories 3, 4 and 6. This section introduces a
basic framework for electricity market modelling and describes how fac-
tors such as price flexible demand, financial investment risk and dynamic
technological improvements can be included into such models.
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The lack of economical storage possibilities combined with relatively
large periodic and stochastic fluctuations in demand and supply of elec-
tricity, place the electricity sector in the extensively treated category of
peak-load pricing problems (Crew (1995)). The main part of literature in
this field has been developed for regulated systems where demand was as-
sumed to be inelastic. The combination of inelastic demand and stochas-
tic supply and demand creates a potential for involuntary rationing of
consumers. The reliability aspect have been extensively treated in the
regulated setting with focus on efficient methods for rationing and mea-
surement of outage costs (Doorman (2000)). Crew (1995) reviews an
extensive set of references that question the accuracy of methods for
measuring outage costs. The main problem is that consumers have a
lack of experience with outages and hence the related costs. As with
utility functions the problem lies not with the theory as such, but rather
with the lack of data and applicability of theory in practice.
The problems with estimation of outage costs and demand elasticity can
be seen as an argument for the introduction of markets with real-time
pricing, where consumers can express their preferences directly through
the markets price. In principle consumers would never pay an infinite
price for electricity and voluntary demand reductions should therefore
ensure that the market clears at a finite price at all times (Schweppe,
Tabors & Bohn (1987)). In such a system there would be no need for
any quantity rationing procedure or capacity regulation. However, the
speed at which bilateral markets operate prevents demand from reacting
to stochastic fluctuations within the time frame (typically a matter of
seconds or less) required to avoid fluctuations in frequency and voltage.
The transaction costs associated with such near continuous trading will
furthermore render such systems economically infeasible.
The potential for situations where demand acts as if it was totally inelas-
tic in real-time, leads to public good issues and hence free rider problems.
Such aspects will tend to decrease investments below the optimal level of
system capacity and increase the risk of blackouts. The California crisis
illustrated that poor market design and an increased risk of blackouts
can lead to costly bankruptcies, costly political intervention and hence
highly negative effects on the economic efficiency that extend far beyond
the direct costs related to involuntary disconnection of consumers.
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The implications of potential involuntary disconnection of consumers for
regulation and market design are treated in the following section. The
focus is kept on how prices and investments are linked through the quan-
tity dimension of electricity and it is therefore implicitly assumed that
market prices are the result of equilibrium in a forward market (e.g. a
day-ahead market) where demand elasticity is sufficient to ensure a finite
market price at all times.
3.2.1 Fixed cost recovery under short-run marginal cost
pricing
The issue of fixed cost recovery under marginal cost pricing has been
a key controversy particularly in peak load pricing theory (Doorman
(2000)). Traditional literature provide different answers depending on
the underlying assumptions about factors such as indivisibility of plant
size, irreversibility of investments, lead times and forecasting abilities
(Andersson & Bohman (1985)).
In a liberalized market with a price elastic demand side, fixed cost re-
covery can be described by a relatively simple model based on short-run
marginal pricing. To explain fixed cost recovery Fraser (2001) use the
cost minimization framework known from the regulating sector, but adds
price elastic demand as a peak load production unit with no fixed cost.
During peak load hours where all available production capacity is in
use, the market price is determined by willingness to pay on the de-
mand side. Figure 3.1 illustrates the derivation of the cost minimizing
solution5, which ensures that the revenue from peak load hours exactly
cover the fixed costs of the most expensive production technology.
The figure illustrates the cost structure for a set of three technologies
N = {A,B,C} in terms of fixed costs (FCn) and variable costs (V Cn).
Voluntary demand reductions are included as a production technology
(D) with variable costs approximated by a constant average marginal
willingness to pay (WTP)6 and zero fixed costs FCD = 0. The tradi-
5The optimization criteria is profit maximization rather than cost minimization in
a liberalized market. The two solutions will however coincide in the stylized deter-
ministic and perfectly competitive framework illustrated in Fraser (2001).
6This highly simplified modelling of the demand side is improved in the following
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Figure 3.1: Deriving the cost minimizing solution with flexible demand
viewed as a peak load unit without fixed costs. Lmax indicates the maxi-
mum load, which equals the amount of production capacity in the system
i.e. CA + CB + CC .
subsection.
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tional approach for cost minimization can now be used to illustrate the
optimal amount of capacity (Cn) for each technology and the resulting
market prices based on marginal cost pricing. The fact that the price
flexible demand side can be viewed as a peak load unit without any fixed
costs solves the problem of fixed cost recovery for the most expensive
technology.
It is crucial to understand that it is not just the peak load production
technology that is dependent on revenue for fixed cost recovery during
the peak load hours where the market price is determined by consumers
WTP. All technologies will exactly recover their fixed costs in an optimal
long run equilibrium. Although a base load plant will recover a smaller
part of its fixed costs during these critical hours in relative terms, it will
recover a a larger amount in absolute terms. This observation is used
extensively in paper D where a framework for inclusion of risk in partial
equilibrium models is provided.
The pricing mechanism illustrated above is static and ignores the poten-
tial for technological developments in the cost structure of production
units. In a more dynamic formulation the total average marginal cost
would depend on the age of the production technology due to wear and
tear. Furthermore, the marginal cost of new investments would be de-
creasing as a result of technological improvements. In such a system it is
likely that a base-load investment could move down the merit order dur-
ing the course of its life time and hence serve as a peak load unit during
the final years of operation. Though this type of dynamic developments
could reduce or even eliminate the need for investments in peak load ca-
pacity it does not change the fundamental pricing mechanism illustrated
in Figure 1. Peak load hours where all available production capacity is in
use must still occur to prevent the units that serve as peak load capacity
from being scrapped.
3.2.2 Partial equilibrium models with demand flexibility
Though the approach of Fraser (2001) includes the effect that demand
elasticity has on prices during peak load hours, it does so based on a
predefined load duration curve. This leads to inconsistencies because of
the circular relation between prices, investments and demand response
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illustrated in Figure 3.2. Price formation in the market will affect the
load duration curve when demand is price elastic. The load duration
curve will affect the structure of the optimal capacity mix, which in
turn will affect price formation. The load-duration curve is therefore
an endogenous part of the equilibrium and cannot be supplied as an
exogenous input.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the circular dependence between load, market
prices and technology choice in a liberalized electricity market.
To properly handle demand elasticity, the market model must be based
on a set of demand curves reflecting the level and elasticity of demand
at each time interval in the model. Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure of
such a model for an annual time horizon. In this graphical illustration
the decision variable determined by the equilibrium model is the hori-
zontal length of the variable cost plateaus, which reflect the amount of
production capacity installed of each type.
Hourly demand curves contain more information and are generally more
difficult to estimate than load-duration curves. This type of exogenous
demand data is however needed to properly model the equilibrium.
Profit maximization is the correct criteria for investment decisions in a
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the range of hourly equilibria in a model with
price flexible demand.
liberalized market. The criteria is however difficult to apply in an equi-
librium context as it requires that definition of a set of producers that
would accurately reflect competition. The use of a single average profit
maximizing producer would correspond to maximization of producer sur-
plus, which in turn would yield the monopoly solution.
Assuming that all parameters are deterministic and that the market is
characterized by perfect competition there is equivalence between profit
maximization and maximization of social surplus i.e. the sum of producer
surplus and consumer surplus. This allows the optimization problem to
be stated as maximization of social surplus, which makes the modelling
less complex. The following equilibrium model describes a market based
on short-run marginal costs with hourly prices determined as the inter-
section between the short run marginal production cost curve and the
demand curve represented by marginal utility of consumption i.e. the
marginal willingness to pay. A set of increasing concave utility functions
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Uh(dh) are used to model the consumer surplus function7 whereas the
producer surplus function is represented by a set of piecewise linear func-
tions representing the fixed cost components FC and variable costs V C
component of each technology i considered.
With maximization of social surplus over a predefined time horizon of
H as the objective and production limits and supply/demand balance as
primary constraints, we can write the equilibrium model as follows:
Maximize ∑H
h=1 U
h(dh)− (∑Ii=1 ∑Hh=1 V Ciqhi + FCiQi)
s.t.
Qi ≥ qhi /1h ; ∀(h ∈ H, i ∈ I)∑H
h=1 q
h
i ≥ dh ; ∀(h ∈ H)
qhi ≥ 0 ; ∀(h ∈ H, i ∈ I)
Qi ≥ 0 ; ∀(i ∈ I)
dh ≥ 0 ; ∀(h ∈ H)
where the index i ∈ I represents the set of individual technologies and
h ∈ H is the set of time steps in hours used in the model.
The following notation is used for parameters and decision variables:
Decision variables
qhi : Amount of power produced by technology i in hour h (MWh)
Qi : Capacity of technology i (MW)
dh : Quantity consumed during hour h (MWh)
Parameters
U(dh) : Utility in hour h from consuming the quantity dh (  )
V Ci : Variable cost for technology i (  /MWh)
FCi : Fixed costs for technology i amortized to the period H
8
For a more intuitive formulation the problem can be written as a com-
plementary optimization problem with primal-dual constraint pairs rep-
resenting quantity-price relations. The first order optimization criteria is
derived by forming the Lagrangian of the problem, differentiating with
respect to each of the decision variables and setting equal to zero.
7Utility function can be seen as inverse demand curves in the Walrasian sense.
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i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I
The non-negative Lagrangian variables (multipliers) pc and pm can be
interpreted as shadow prices to each of the primary quantity based con-
straints in the primal problem. The three optimality conditions derived
from the Lagrangian can be seen as primary constraints in the price based
dual problem and have the three original decision variables as their dual
counterparts. This interpretation yields five primal-dual constraint pairs,
which express the relationship between price and quantity in the model.
Demand optimality condition:
∂U/∂(dh)− pmh ≥ 0 ∀h (3.9)
dh ≥ 0 ∀h (3.10)
This primal-dual pair states that the market price pm is always defined
by the marginal utility of consumption. The two are equal at all positive
demand levels and demand is only zero if price is larger than the marginal
utility at zero consumption.
Production optimality condition:
pmh − V Ci − pchi ≥ 0 ∀h, i (3.11)
qhi ≥ 0 ∀h (3.12)
This second primal-dual pair states that price can be larger than marginal
costs V C for all technologies by an amount equal to pc. Combined with
the demand optimality pair above it illustrates that the market price
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is always determined by marginal utility of demand but can exceed the





pchi ≥ 0 ∀i (3.13)
Qi ≥ 0 ∀i (3.14)
The capacity optimality conditions ensures that the sum of capacity price
adders earned by a specific technology over all time intervals must exactly
equal its fixed cost. The primal-dual pair states that installed capacity
will be positive if the sum of capacity adders (defined by the production
optimality constraint as price minus V C) is equal to fixed costs, but zero





qhi − dh ≥ 0 ∀h (3.15)
pmh ≥ 0 ∀h (3.16)
The fourth primal/dual constraint pair ensures that the market clears at
a positive price if the sum of all production equals demand. Production
in excess of demand implies a market price of zero.
Primal capacity constraint:
Qi − qhi /1h ≥ 0 ∀h, i (3.17)
pchi ≥ 0 ∀h, i (3.18)
The final complementary constraint pair states that the capacity price
adder pc will be positive if production on technology i during h (measured
in energy per hour (MWh/h)) is equal to the capacity limit for technology
i. If production is less than the capacity limit pc must be zero.
The model forms the basis for understanding the long-run market equilib-
rium in electricity markets and the fixed cost recovery of new generation
capacity. The following section examines how investment risk can be
included into this type of modelling framework.
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3.2.3 Including risk into PE models
Section 3.1 illustrated how risk and risk aversion could be modelled when
the electricity price can be treated as an exogenous input to the invest-
ment problem. Such an assumption is reasonable for the individual in-
vestment decisions when a decision maker cannot affect the electricity
price through his actions. Modelling the effect of risk becomes signifi-
cantly more complex in a market setting, where prices must be endoge-
nously determined within the model.
Hazell & Norton (1986) provides a framework for market equilibrium
under risk in an agricultural setting. The models are based on stochastic
production (yield) and price as the two dependent stochastic variables.
Electricity markets with a large share of hydro power will also have sup-
ply uncertainty and much of this theory can therefore be used in an
electricity market context. Without addressing the details of this frame-
work we note that the derived objective function can be seen as the
sum of areas under demand curves based on either expected or actual
realized supply functions (depending on price assumptions made by the
suppliers) minus the cost of supply including a risk adjustment. The an-
alytical framework shows that social surplus can be used to model profit
maximization if the proper adjustments are made for risk.
Paper D introduces a more practically oriented framework for risk in-
clusion motivated by the need for tractability. Including stochastic pa-
rameters in equilibrium models is generally problematic, because it leads
to analytically complex and/or large models structures. Incorporation
of risk measures is also a source of complexity as these tend to create
non-convex models. Hazell & Norton (1986) suggests a mean variance
type adjustment and an approach for linearizing the variance term. Lin-
earizing will however involve a tradeoff between accuracy and size and
tractability is therefore also problematic in such approaches. Further-
more, one cannot linearized more mathematically complex risk measures
such as Value at Risk.
To circumvent these complications paper D introduces a framework based
on a separation of the risk adjustment from the equilibrium model. The
framework is based on the basic idea that risk aversion can be viewed as
a technology specific fixed cost adder. Adding the risk premium to the
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fixed cost component ensures that there is no conflict with the short-run
marginal pricing criteria and hence the assumption of perfect competi-
tion. The separation will naturally lead to potential inconsistencies, but
the decision maker can choose a tradeoff between inconsistencies and
tractability through the level of interaction and shared data between the
two modules.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the setup with a partial equilibrium model of the
power market and a risk module. The power market model calculates ex-
pected prices and optimal investments whereas the risk module translates
prices, costs and volumes into risk premiums. Based on the interaction
between the input and output from these two modules and the amount
of shared data, four levels of consistency have been derived.
The simplest approach is based on a complete separation where the only
interaction between the two modules lies with the use of technology spe-
cific risk premiums calculated by the risk module as fixed cost adders in
the deterministic power market model. The distributions for parameters
needed in the risk module including market prices, production volumes
and costs are all assumed as exogenous input. This approach has a signif-
icant lack of consistency in the sense that there is no mechanism, which
ensures that the market prices pt and production volumes qit calculated
as output from the power market model will be identical to the values
used as input in the risk adjustment module. In fact one obtains a frame-
work where an initial exogenous input value for a given parameter will
affect the output value of that same parameter.
The level 1 approach can be made more consistent through an iterative
procedure where output from the power model is used as input to a sub-
sequent run with the risk module. By repeating this type of iterative
procedure until convergence, the mean values for prices and production
volumes can then be made consistent in the two modules. However, be-
cause market prices and production volumes are functions of the specific
technology costs and the structure of demand, it is crucial that depen-
dencies between all of these four parameters are modelled in the risk
adjustment module. The need to specify such dependencies exogenously
is generally a more difficult task and hence a significant drawback with
this level 2 approach.
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Figure 3.4: Different levels of consistency in a framework for risk inclu-
sion based on a separate PE model and risk module.
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Level 3 improves consistency by using data from the risk module on
cost, demand and volume distributions to calculate the distribution of
prices and production quantities. It does so however without resorting
to the complex construction of a stochastic model. The basic idea is
to use the optimal capacity mix obtained as output from the determin-
istic power market model as the basis for scenario simulations. This
additional Monte Carlo simulation module uses the exogenous data con-
cerning distributions of cost and demand (and any production volume
effects not controlled by the decision maker) to simulate scenarios s for
hourly supply and demand curves in a system based on the capacity
mix found by the power market model. This leads to a distribution of
prices pt,s and production volumes qt,i,s and hence eliminate the need for
exogenous assumptions about the distribution of these parameters and
correlations. The section on experimental results in Paper D examines
the use of a level 3 approach in detail.
Level 4 further enhance consistency by making the optimization model
stochastic. The risk module and the PE model can still by kept sepa-
rated in order to keep the structure of the stochastic optimization model
as simple as possible, however an iterative procedure will then still be re-
quired to secure consistency between risk premiums, production volumes
and market prices. Level 4 comes closest to the analytical framework
suggested in Hazell & Norton (1986) since the optimization will take the
stochastic nature of demand and supply curves into account. It is more
consistent than level 3 but also considerably more difficult to solve.
3.3 The regulator’s perspective
The California debacle (Faruqui (2001)) showed that liberalization of
electricity markets will neither decrease the need for regulation nor make
it less complex. To become a successful experiment the market must
be designed to provide a satisfactory balance between the three main
requirements of economic efficiency, security of supply and environmental
protection (ECON (2002)).
The first fundamental welfare theorem establishes a benchmark for so-
cial optimality and states that regulatory market intervention should be
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motivated when market imperfections or sources of market failure lead
to incomplete or imperfectly competitive markets. Market imperfections
include transaction costs, whereas sources of market failure include the
four main categories; externalities, public goods, informational asymme-
tries and market power (Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1998)).
A primary task for regulators is to access whether or not the charac-
teristics of electricity as a good will lead to such market imperfection
or sources of market failure and to design the market to minimize the
potential consequences of these factors.
3.3.1 Demand side flaws and the quality dimension of
electricity
To understand the link between sources of market failure and security
of supply it is useful to view electricity in terms of both a quality and
a quantity dimension. Electricity is not valued solely as an end-product
by consumers, but rather through the services that it provides. Most
electricity dependent services are planned ahead and are based on the
assumption that a stable supply of electricity will be available at request.
Electricity is therefore not only valued through its quantity dimension,
but also in terms of reliability as a quality dimension.
The qualitative dimension of electricity has public good characteristics.
Once a unit of capacity has been added to the system all consumers
benefit from the increased reliability that it provides (Abbott (2001))
and electricity quality is therefore a non-exclusive good. Reliability is
also a non-rival good, because once produced it is unaffected by the
amount of consumers that obtains a benefit.
The non-exclusive property of reliability arises because system operators
lack the technology required to disconnect consumers individually in case
of an inadequate supply. This lack of technology is characterized by Stoft
(2002) as the second demand side flaw of electricity markets9. A similar
point was actually stressed in much earlier work on public utility pricing
(Brown & Johnson (1969)).
9The first demand flaw is a lack of real-time metering and real-time billing, which
causes a lack of demand elasticity in the market.
66
3.3.2 System security and system adequacy
Electricity is not delivered at discrete points in time, but rather as a con-
tinuous flow of electrons. Even though consumers can gradually change
their consumption patterns and make decisions based on real-time me-
tering they cannot continuously monitor prices and react on a continuous
basis. The electricity market is therefore generally structured through a
series of forward markets where production and consumption plans are
balanced. An real-time price adjustment is then performed ex post, once
deviations between traded volumes and the actual real-time exchange
becomes known. Handling of real-time deviations between the planned
balance and the actual balance requires detailed information about sup-
ply, demand and transmission conditions throughout the interconnected
system. By economies of coordination it is generally most efficiently
handled by a centralized unit such as an independent system operator.
Reliability of electricity systems is usually described through the two
components of system adequacy and system security. System security
refers to the system’s ability to withstand sudden short-term distur-
bances such as an unexpected loss of system elements. System adequacy
implies that a sufficient amount of generation capacity is installed to
ensure system security in the long term10 (Morey (2001)). Although
this terminology is common in the literature, it is important to realize
that the two concepts are highly interdependent. System adequacy is by
definition a prerequisite for system security, because long-term decisions
inevitably affects system balancing in the short-term. Similarly, one can
view the long-term as made up by a series of short-terms. System bal-
ancing in the long-term is therefore only relevant for system reliability
to the extent that it helps ensure system balancing in the short-term.
Another way of looking at the responsibility for system balance is to
distinguish between a physical and a financial responsibility. System op-
erators are generally held responsible for maintaining a physical balance
through operation of the real-time market, whereas market players (e.g.
producers, retailers and consumers) are held financially responsible for
balancing of traded volumes ahead of real-time.
10A more stringent technical definition of the two terms can be found in Stoft (2002).
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3.3.3 Commercial capacity and ancillary services
Electricity supply and demand must be kept in a near instantaneous
balance to avoid fluctuations in frequency and voltage that can damage
transmission and generation equipment. The requirement of a near in-
stantaneous balancing between supply and demand in electricity markets,
imply a need for production capacity with different operating character-
istics. A fundamental distinction is generally made between commercial
capacity operating reserves. Operating reserves are part of a long list
of ancillary services used by the system operator to ensure physical bal-
ancing and reliability in the system. This section address only operating
reserves used to provide frequency control. What separates operating
reserves from commercial capacity is that they contribute directly to
the quality dimension of electricity by fulfilling requirements to response
times and activation method set by the system operator.
Frequency control services close the gap between the last ex ante trade
and real-time, by balancing any deviations. In the dimensioning pro-
cess they are typically divided into contingency reserves and regulation
reserves (NEMMCO (2001)). Contingency reserves are used to replace
capacity lost as a result of a forced outage in either generation or trans-
mission elements. Regulation reserves are used to correct for imbalances
due to forecast errors in production or consumption. Activation times
differ depending on the way such capacity is used by the system operator
(e.g. as primary, secondary or tertiary contingency reserves).
The key problem with a market based solution for operating reserves lies
with the demand side of the market. The economics of coordination and
the lack of speed in bilateral markets, imply that a market for operating
reserves must be run at some point before real-time. In a perfectly
competitive and complete market each balance responsible participant11
should be willing to demand reserve capacity until a point where the ex
ante market price equals the expected ex post costs of the expected level
of real-time imbalances.
However, any increase in the amount of capacity reserves supplied to
11We use the term balance responsible participant to define market players who are
held financially responsible for any real-time imbalances compared to traded volumes
in the energy market.
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the market through the reserve market will increase the reliability for
all consumers and decrease the general costs of imbalances. The full
value of reliability will hence never be captured by the entity paying for
the operating reserve capacity in the reserve market. This is the free
rider problem associated with the public good property and indicates
that supply and demand in such a market will not accurately reflect the
consumers preferences for reliability. The system operator must therefore
estimate and procure operating reserve capacity in the reserve market on
behalf of consumers or more generally on behalf of balance responsible
entities.
3.3.4 Models for regulation of system balance
The following assumes a system where the system operator is held re-
sponsible for physical balancing of the system and where and market
players are held financial responsible for balancing their trades in the
energy market12. The element of capacity regulation in the market de-
sign can then distinguished by: A) The degree and method of regulation
used by the system operator to ensure the capacity required for physical
real-time balancing of the system, and B) The method used to enforce
the financial responsibility of market participants.
Focussing on the distinction between commercial capacity and operating
reserves we list three main categories of market models:
1. Value of Lost Load (VOLL) pricing
2. Regulation of Operating Reserves (OR)
3. Regulation of Commercial capacity and Operating Reserves
Value of Lost Load pricing: The first demand side flaw of electricity
12We use the term energy market to describe the last forward market where the
smallest traded time blocks are priced ex ante. The term physical market is misleading
because the actual physical trading can only take place in real-time with ex post
pricing. We therefore use the term energy market to describe the last forward market
before the actual real-time measurement e.g. a day-ahead, an hour ahead or a half-
hour ahead market.
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markets implies that the lack of real-time metering and transaction costs
associated with continuous trading can lead to situations where available
supply cannot cover the inelastic part of the real-time demand curve.
During periods with load shedding market prices must be capped at some
finite level. This price cap Pcap will be regulatory and will effectively
cap the prices in all forward markets. The cap express the price that the
system operator would be willing to pay for an additional unit of capacity
value and should optimally approximate the Value of Lost Load (VOLL)
i.e. the cost incurred by consumers who are involuntarily disconnected.
The key element of a pure VOLL pricing model is that no regulatory
action takes place until the point where load shedding is necessary. The
public good aspect of electricity quality implies however, that the system
operator must impose an artificial demand in the reserve market and a
system based purely on VOLL pricing is therefore primarily a theoretical
model.
Regulation of Operating Reserves: Two main streams of models
for regulation of operating reserves can be identified by distinguishing
between whether or not the auction for capacity reserves (the reserve
market) is cleared before or after the energy market is cleared13.
Reserve market cleared after the energy market: Models where
the system operator purchases a predetermined level of operating reserve
capacity OR in the reserve market after the energy market has been
cleared, will be termed ORexpost models. Such models are based on the
operating reserve requirement OR and the price cap imposed when the
requirement cannot be met Pcap as the two key regulatory parameters.
This type of model is described in detail in So¨der (2002) and Stoft (2002).
So¨der (2002) describes the model in terms of a single market where energy
prices are capped whenever the available amount of total capacity falls
below OR . The price cap Pcap limits the size of price spikes in the market
and the operating reserves requirement determines the duration of such
price spikes. The Loss Of Load Probability (LOLP) will in the long-run
be determined completely by the regulatory parameters Pcap and OR
13The market could be designed with a simultaneous clearing of the two markets,
however the distinction still holds in such a context, since one of the markets must
take precedence in the clearing process.
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and the shape of the demand distribution. Under stylized assumptions
(such as risk neutrality) system operators can obtain the desired level
of LOLP (in long-run equilibrium) through an infinite combinations of
Pcap and OR. A small Pcap requires a correspondingly large OR and vice
versa.
Stoft (2003a) shows that the single market analogy can be extended to
systems where the market is divided into an energy market and a market
for operating reserves. The price cap is then the maximum price paid
for reserves during periods where available reserve capacity is less than
the required amount OR.
The equivalence with the So¨der (2002) framework rests on the assump-
tion of arbitrage between the two markets. Most producers that can
supply operating reserves could alternative choose to supply this capac-
ity in the energy market. This implies that there will be an arbitrage
relation between the energy market price and the reserve market price14
adjusted for risk i.e. Penergy = E[Preserves]+RP
15. If players anticipate a
shortage of supply in the reserve market they will refrain from selling pro-
duction in the energy market until the expected payment for reserves16
defined by the price cap equals the energy market price. The price cap
imposed in the operating reserve market will therefore translate into a
price cap on energy market prices, which in turn will drive the incentive
for investments in both commercial capacity and reserves.
Stoft (2002) states that the use of a large OR requirement and a cor-
respondingly small Pcap can be desirable, because this combination in-
creases the duration of price spikes and decrease the size. This has the
positive effect of decreasing financial risk and the potential for exercise
market power. The tradeoff is that production capacity with marginal
costs above Pcap or demand flexibility with a marginal willingness to pay
above Pcap are lost to the market. The pure VOLL model described
in (Stoft (2002)) can be seen as a special case of this framework with
OR = 0 and Pcap = V OLL.
14Reserve market price is seen here as the total payment for reserves, which may
include both a capacity and a real-time energy price component.
15The risk premium RP expresses the cost of hedging risk associated with the supply
of reserve power
16Again properly adjusted for any costs of hedging in the reserve market.
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A key problem with the stylized ORexpost models, described in So¨der
(2002) and Stoft (2003a), is that the models are based on the assumptions
that new capacity can be added instantaneously and that LOLP can
be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium value. Both assumptions have
the unfortunate effect that the model ignores the aspect of short-term
reliability. The system operator does not ensure that the amount of
required reserve capacity is actually available in the reserve market at
all times i.e. in the short-term. Periods with an insufficient amount of
operating reserve are actually an integrated part of the model, because
they provide the key incentive for new investments.
Reserve market cleared before the energy market: The ORexante
model reverses the order by which the energy and reserve market are
cleared. By clearing the reserve market ahead of the energy market the
system operator ensures that the capacity needed cover the estimated
demand for operating reserves is available when needed.
Keeping capacity for operating reserves out of the energy market does
not increase total system capacity and the short-run effect is therefore
a correspondingly decrease in the capacity made available in the energy
market. The ORexante model does however represent a potential im-
provement in short-run reliability, if consumer price flexibility is more
correctly displayed in the energy market than in the real-time market. A
consumer price flexibility that enables clearing of the energy market at a
finite price at all times, is a sufficient condition for such an improvement.
The need for price caps in the reserve market arise with a probability
corresponding to the estimated short-term LOLP. Though the price cap
imposed during such periods should reflect estimated VOLL, this regu-
lated price is not a crucial parameter for investments in new capacity
in the ORexante model. Periods with insufficient reserve capacity in a
ORexante occur with a short-run LOLP probability determined by the
system operator, rather than as a result of investments made based on
the Pcap prices as in the ORexpost model.
Producers (or consumers) who sign a contract with the system operator
for the supply of operating reserves, are effectively selling a call option on
the right to supply that capacity in the energy market. Such an option
has a value that depends on the time horizon for contracting and on the
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way that pricing in the real-time market is structured. Paper C analyzes
the call option based model for regulation of operating reserves and the
resulting interaction between energy and real-time prices. The analyzes
illustrate a series of complex effects, which must be considered in the
design of markets based this type of regulation.
Comparison and literature: The main potential drawback with the
ORexante model is the economic costs of ex ante regulation. The uncer-
tainty related to real-time imbalances are an increasing function of the
time horizon ∆T (RM → RTM) and long-term contracting will there-
fore tend to more conservative and hence more costly. If the energy
market clears at a finite price at all times, then the ORexante model
should ensure a short-run LOLP regardless of the time horizon used and
short-term contracting will then be preferable.
Supply and demand are random variables and the risk of load shedding
due to situations with insufficient operating reserves can never be elimi-
nated. Even the ORexante model must impose price cap regulation during
such occurrences. The key difference between the two models is however,
that the ORexante model provides a capacity payment in advance to avoid
such situations. In the ORexpost such payments are only provided once
a shortage of operating reserves actually occurs.
The complex structure of OR models has been extensively treated in
recent literature. Nilssen & Walther (2001) describe the construction
of a Norwegian market for call options on capacity for handling imbal-
ances between volumes traded day-ahead and actual real-time balances.
Amundsen & Mortensen (2001) and Lauen, Bjorndahlen, Hauch & Eng-
berg (2003) provides a general analysis of different models for regulation
of operating reserves within the Nordic market model. So¨der (1999) dis-
cusses the aspect of responsibility in this type of model structure and
Chao & Wilson (1999) and Stoft (2002) describe an auction model for
optimal design for call options on reserve capacity. Finally, paper C
presents an overview of models and an analysis of the different design
parameters in a call option based system.
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3.3.5 Regulation of commercial capacity
The Installed Capacity Payments (ICaP) model currently implemented
in several US market designs (Bowring & Gramlich (2000)), (NYISO
(2003)) and (CAISO (2002)), is the most widely applied and studied
model that includes capacity regulation of commercial reserves.
The ICaP approach sets up an explicit market for capacity over a given
time frame. Demand is driven by imposing a regulatory obligation on
load-serving entities to buy capacity credits corresponding to their ex-
pected demand during the time period. Hoobs, Inon & Kahal (2001)
describes the ICaP as a model based on:
• A definition of the total amount of installed capacity (QICap) re-
quired, based on expected demand and reliability requirements;
• An allocation of responsibility for this capacity and establishment
of a system for trade of capacity credits;
• A penalty for non-compliance Ppenalty
The time horizon ∆T (ICap → RTM) used for enforcement of the capac-
ity requirements should be added to these characteristics as an important
additional parameter. If this time horizon is less than the lead times of
investments in new capacity the ICap model will have a pricing mecha-
nism analogous to the ORexpost model.
Since the capacity mix is fixed during the ICap period17 a competitive
ICap market price can only be in one of two possible states. Either
the required level of capacity is not available during the period, and the
capacity price will then be equal to Ppenalty signalling a need for more
investments. This corresponds to the situation in the ORexpost model
where available reserve capacity is less than OR and the price is capped
at Pcap. If alternatively, the available amount of capacity is larger than
the QICap requirement a competitive market will lead to a capacity price
of zero. Following the analogy to the ORexpost model this corresponds to
17Due to the assumption of time horizon shorter than lead times of new capacity
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periods where sufficient capacity bids are available and the reserve price
equals the reservation costs of the marginal unit.
The key thing to notice is that capacity credits will have a positive price
and hence provide scarcity rent only during those periods where capac-
ity is insufficient and ICap prices equal Ppenalty. Although suggested
in numerous papers, the idea that the ICap market price would equal
the amortized fixed cost component of new capacity in a competitive
market, is fundamentally flawed. The only thing that should keep a ra-
tional generator from selling ICap certificates at a price infinitely close to
zero, when the available supply exceeds regulated demand, would be the
opportunity to exercise market power or the opportunity to bank cer-
tificates for sale during subsequent ICap periods. Similarly, consumers
would always pay a price infinitely close to the penalty price for certifi-
cates in periods where demand exceeds available supply, unless the ICaP
period is made long enough to enable new investments within the period.
The ICap price mechanism is similar to the long-term framework ana-
lyzed in paper E on markets for Tradable Green Certificates. In this
system the ability to bank certificates between the time periods is a vi-
tal part of the pricing mechanism and is essential for the argument that
prices will settle at the sum of amortized fixed costs and variable costs
(i.e. the long-run marginal costs) for new investments. If the concept of
banking was transferred to the ICap model it could potentially improve
the pricing mechanism, however the consequences for supply security
within each period would have to be analyzed and this idea has not been
treated in any literature describing the ICap system.
Capacity auctions or tendering rounds for investments in new commercial
capacity can as a parallel to the ORexante model for operating reserves. In
such an approach the system operator would plan in advance how much
capacity is needed in the system and pay for it through auctions held
sufficiently ahead of real-time to account for the lead times associated
with plant construction. Regulation of commercial capacity with such
approach implies that the system operator takes over the completely
responsible for new investments. This would contradict one of the main
arguments for liberalization, namely that financial incentives in a market
would improve such decision making.
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An analysis of methods for regulation of both operating reserves and
commercial capacity is provided in paper C where a general framework
for capacity regulation models is provided.
3.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter has reviewed problems related to investments in genera-
tion capacity and security of supply from three different perspectives.
References to relevant literature has been provided and the chapter has




The preceding chapters have analyzed specific problems related to risk
management and investment decisions in liberalized electricity markets.
Theory and applications have been reviewed and the five papers have
contributed to research within specific problem areas.
The five papers have covered a broad area, but are bound together by a
focus on the effects of financial risk in a liberalized electricity market. All
five papers have contributed to the primary goal of the thesis, to increase
the understanding of how the introduction of competitive markets affects
the financial risk related to risk management and investment related
decision problems in electricity markets. Particulary paper C and D and
E have have focussed on applied microeconomics and the analyzes of the
interplay between market design and the technical characteristics of the
electricity system. Papers A, B and D have contributed directly to the
secondary goal of development of modelling tools, that enable decision
makers in liberalized electricity market to take financial risk into account.
Paper A has provided a modelling tool for construction of high resolu-
tion forward price curves and illustrated the value of a combined use
of bottom-up data and market price data. Experimental results showed
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that the model outperforms best alternative models based solely on mar-
ket data.
Paper B has analyzed financial models for electricity price modelling and
illustrated that the set of market based input data used for such mod-
elling are likely to have a larger effect on subsequent decision problems
than structural choices.
Paper C has shown how different models for capacity regulation are
linked and has analyzed sources of market failure and market imper-
fections induced by electricity market characteristics. Two distinctions
are shown to be critical for capacity regulation A) whether regulation
is restricted to operating reserves only or includes both commercial ca-
pacity and operating reserves and B) the method of procurement and
particularly whether or not operating reserve capacity is reserved and
hence kept out of the energy market.
Paper D has presented a framework for inclusion of investment risk into
partial equilibrium models based on a tradeoff between consistency and
model tractability. The framework shows how the practically accepted
risk measure Value at Risk can be implemented in such market models
and illustrates that the inclusion of stochastic demand and stochastic
variable cost affects the optimal capacity mix and hence market prices
differently.
Paper E has derived mean-variance risk management strategies for wind
turbine owners in a market system with tradable green certificates. The
negative correlations between electricity prices and TGC prices and be-
tween volume and price in the TGC market are illustrated and used to
examine the consequences of such market design.
The relatively broad areas covered by the papers in the thesis has indi-
cated a need for further research along several dimensions. Risk man-
agement measures need to be developed to more accurately fit the char-
acteristics of electricity markets and electricity assets. The general lack
of data for individual risk factor modelling and modelling of dependen-
cies between risk factors should also be addressed and more advanced
methods for data selection must be developed.
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Concerning investments there is a need for an improved modelling of the
effect of financial risk on investment decisions both at an individual and
a market level. Modern investment theory has focussed on real option
values and this perspective has also received significant attention in elec-
tricity applications. The modelling of how risk affects the investment
decision, has however received relatively scarce attention in electricity
market applications. The topic has been addressed at a market level and
from a modelling point of view in this thesis.
Finally, there is a need for further research on the effects of different
types of capacity regulation in a liberalized market setting. This the-
sis has addressed the topic by providing an overview of models and a
qualitative analysis, however theoretical work and quantitative analysis
of more complex market design structures are needed.
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